Jurisdiction over Those Who Breach Their Contracts: The Lessons of Burger King by Louis, Martin B.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 72 | Number 1 Article 5
11-1-1993
Jurisdiction over Those Who Breach Their
Contracts: The Lessons of Burger King
Martin B. Louis
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina
Law Review by an authorized administrator of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Martin B. Louis, Jurisdiction over Those Who Breach Their Contracts: The Lessons of Burger King, 72 N.C. L. Rev. 55 (1993).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol72/iss1/5
JURISDICTION OVER THOSE WHO BREACH THEIR
CONTRACTS: THE LESSONS OF BURGER KING
MARTIN B. Louis*
The minimum contacts test announced in International Shoe
Co. v. Washington requires that a defendant have "certain mini-
mum contacts" with a forum state for that state to assert personal
jurisdiction under the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Although this minimum contacts inquiry into per-
sonal jurisdiction has been in effect since International Shoe was
decided almost fifty years ago, there has been little explication
from the Supreme Court about how this test should be applied in
contract cases.
In this Article, Professor Martin Louis first challenges the
conventional wisdom that jurisdiction in contract cases is doctri-
nally different than in cases involving torts. Professor Louis then
argues that any different treatment can be explained by the fac-
tual relationship the defendant has with the forum state rather
than the legal theory of the claim. Employing a 'functional anal-
ysis" ofjurisdiction over promisors in a variety of paradigms, he
then establishes that courts will act similarly when faced with
analogous fact patterns and situations. Professor Louis con-
cludes by observing that the principal "lesson of Burger King "
may be that it leaves personal jurisdiction jurisprudence in con-
tract cases with more uncertainties than answers.
I. ImTRODUCTION
In International Shoe Co. v. Washington,' the United States Supreme
Court introduced the minimum contacts test for personal jurisdiction over
corporations.2 In apparent explication of this new test, the Court reviewed
its treatment of a few familiar jurisdictional paradigms under its former-
* Paul B. Eaton Professor of Law, University of North Carolina School of Law. A.B.
1956, Princeton University; LL.B., 1959, LL.M., 1965 Harvard University.
In the course of writing this article, I received many helpful comments and suggestions from
my civil procedure colleagues. I thank Wendy Coleman for her dedicated research assistance.
1. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
2. Id. at 316. The minimum contacts test was designed, of course, to illuminate the constitu-
tional limitations upon state judicial jurisdiction contained in the due process clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. The test requires that the defendant
have "certain minimum contacts" with the state such that maintenance of the suit does not offend
"traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." Id.
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but now recognized as fictitious-"presence" test.3  Presence-and now
presumably minimum contacts-existed, the Court stated, if a corporation's
activities within the forum state were "continuous and systematic" and gave
rise to the liabilities sued on.4 Presence did not necessarily exist, however,
if a corporation committed "some single or occasional [liability creating]
acts" within the forum state.5 Nonresident motor vehicle torts, said the
Court, were examples of single acts constituting presence; 6 the local con-
tractual activity of a nonresident corporate buyer, however-whose orders
were sometimes placed by mail and sometimes by a local representative-
was a single act that would not create minimum contacts.7
This first look at the minimum contacts test was quite conservative.
Today the test includes natural persons, as well as corporations,' and can be
satisfied by some single contracts,9 as well as by most single, local torts.10
3. Id. at 317-19. Preliminarily, the Court had noted that its traditional reference to a corpo-
ration's "presence" was a fiction that merely symbolized those authorized activities of the corpo-
ration's agents and servants within the state sufficient to satisfy the demands of due process and
make it reasonable to require the corporation to defend there. Id. at 316-17. Hence, cases which
found that a corporation's activities amounted to a "presence" presumably became precedent for a
finding that minimum contacts existed.
4. Id. at 317.
5. Id. at 318.
6. The Court cited cases upholding jurisdiction under nonresident motor vehicle acts and
then explained that the language of consent employed in these cases was merely another, now
superseded, legal fiction. lId
7. -la. (citing Rosenberg Bros. & Co. v. Curtis Brown Co., 260 U.S. 516 (1923)). Rosen-
berg also was the principal citation in Helicopteros Nacionales De Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466
U.S. 408, 417-18 (1984). In Helicopteros the question was whether substantial business purchases
within the forum would support an assertion of general jurisdiction-that is, jurisdiction over a
cause of action that did not arise within the forum or out of the purchases. Id. at 418 n.12. Noting
that Rosenberg, as interpreted by International Shoe, had held that local purchases would not even
support specific jurisdiction-that is, jurisdiction over a cause of action arising out of the
purchases-the Court in Helicopteros properly concluded such activity obviously could not sup-
port general jurisdiction. Id. Today, a nonresident retailer who regularly purchases from a local
manufacturer or wholesaler, whether by telephone, mail order, or through a buyer who visits the
seller's place of business, probably would be subject to specific jurisdiction in the seller's state.
See infra text accompanying note 142. Rosenberg, therefore, may not possess continuing validity
on the question of specific jurisdiction-a question the Helicopteros Court wisely noted that it
was not deciding. 466 U.S. at 418 n.12. Curiously, neither the Supreme Court's decision in
Rosenberg nor the opinion below, 285 F. 879 (W.D.N.Y. 1921), states that plaintiff's cause of
action arose out of the defendant's purchases. Thus, it is unclear whether Rosenberg was a case of
specific or general jurisdiction. Cf. William B. Rudenko, Note, The Adoption of the Liberal The-
ory of Foreign Corporations, 79 U. PA. L. REv. 956, 970 (1931) (asserting without citation or
other documentation that the cause of action arose out of a contract consummated in New York).
8. Although International Shoe's first statement of the minimum contacts test was general,
and not specifically limited to corporations, 326 U.S. at 316, thereafter the opinion spoke only of
corporations. Years later, when the Court finally decided cases involving individual defendants,
the applicability of the minimum contacts test to them was assumed without discussion. E.g.,
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 466 (1985).
9. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 478 (upholding jurisdiction over individuals party to a single
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Nevertheless, International Shoe's tentative jurisdictional distinction be-
tween tortfeasor defendants and defendants who breach their contracts has
persisted," in part because the Supreme Court never directly addressed the
distinction. Indeed, before the decision in Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz' 2 in 1985, the Court had considered the application of the mini-
mum contacts test to promisors only twice. 3 Although both decisions sug-
gested that jurisdictional assertions in contract cases would be generously
reviewed, 4 both involved the heavily regulated business of insurance,
franchise agreement); Compania de Astral, S.A. v. Boston Metals Co., 107 A.2d 357,366-69 (Md.
1954) (upholding local jurisdiction over a nonresident company that agreed to purchase several
ships and then defaulted).
10. Nelson v. Miller, 143 N.E.2d 673, 676-80 (Il. 1957); Smyth v. Twin State Improvement
Corp., 80 A.2d 664, 666-69 (Vt. 1951).
11. In Smyth, the court avoided discussion of International Shoe's alleged distinction be-
tween contract and tort by limiting its discussion to single torts. Smyth, 80 A.2d at 666. In
Erlanger Mills, Inc. v. Cohoes Fibre Mills, 239 F.2d 502, 507-08 (4th Cir. 1956), a single contract
case, the court declined to respond to the plaintiff's argument that single contract defendants
should be as amenable to jurisdiction as single tort defendants already were, and held only that the
contacts in the case before it were less impressive than the contacts found in the single contract
and tort cases that the plaintiff had cited. An early consideration of the distinction is found in
Developments In The Law: State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARv. L. Rlv. 909, 926-28 (1960) [here-
inafter Developments] (pointing to the greater difficulty of localizing a contract that could be
negotiated, executed, and performed in different states). The strongest recent judicial affirmation
of the distinction is found in Lakeside Bridge & Steel Co. v. Mountain State Constr. Co., Inc., 597
F.2d 596, 603 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 907 (1980), a single contract case denying
local jurisdiction over a nonresident purchaser of an expensive, custom-made item. In explaining
its result, the court examined the "effects" test adopted by the REsTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF CON-
FUicr OF LAws §§ 37, 50 (1971) (asserting specific jurisdiction over a person who "causes effects
in the state by an act done elsewhere"). The court first noted that comment a to § 37 stated that
where the effects "are not of a sort highly dangerous to persons or things, the question whether the
state may exercise jurisdiction over the defendant is likely to depend at least in part upon whether
the defendant has other relationships to the state." Lakeside Bridge, 597 F.2d at 602. The court
went on to explain as follows:
[Tihe forum state has a greater interest in protecting its citizens by providing a local
forum in cases which involve effects "of a sort highly dangerous to persons and things
... ." The forum state has a lesser interest in protecting a corporation in an interstate
contract dispute, especially when the corporation left the state to solicit and secure the
contract, because the effects of a commercial contract are unlikely to involve danger to
persons or things within the state's borders.
Id. at 602-03 n.11 (quoting R.STATEmENT (SECOND) OF COiN'.cr OF LAws § 37 cmt. a (1971)).
12. 471 U.S. 462, 466 (1985).
13. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222-24 (1957) (upholding jurisdic-
tion over an insurance company that had assumed through merger a single policy covering a
resident of the forum state); Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643, 648-49 (1950)
(upholding the state's regulatory jurisdiction over the defendant insurance company, which did
local business only through the mails, and suggesting it also would uphold jurisdiction in local
claims actions by the policy holders).
14. Indeed some commentators have suggested that McGee itself was authority for upholding
jurisdiction in routine single contract cases. See, e.g., Mark J. Gentile, Note, Long-Arm Jurisdic-
tion in Commercial Litigation: When is a Contract a Contact?, 61 B.U. L. REv. 375, 384-87
(1981).
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which many people consider to be jurisdictionally special.'" Hence, the
impact of these two decisions on unregulated promisors, particularly parties
to single contracts, was uncertain.
From 1959 to 1976, the Supreme Court did not decide a single per-
sonal jurisdiction case despite he fact that the states were busily enacting
and aggressively applying their long-arm statutes. 6 The Court finally
broke its silence in 197717 and since then has handed down one or more
jurisdictional decisions in almost every term. None of the earliest of these
cases involved contracts. Indeed, over persistent dissents the Court denied
certiorari in several single contract cases despite an alleged conflict among
the circuits in this area.'8 Finally in 1985, the Court handed down Burger
King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 19 which technically was a single contract case,
but was strongly influenced by its special facts-the substantial, long-term
franchise relationship out of which the dispute arose.2" Burger King is also
one of the few recent Supreme Court decisions upholding a state's assertion
of jurisdiction2' and the only majority opinion authored by Justice Brennan,
the Court's strongest pro-jurisdictional voice. 2 Consequently, Burger King
15. See, e.g., Lakeside Bridge, 597 F.2d at 600 (suggesting that McGee was limited to insur-
ance cases); Developments, supra note 11, at 928 (same); see also Vencedor Mfg. Co. v. Gougler
Indus., Inc., 557 F.2d 886, 890 (1st Cir. 1977) (suggesting McGee's sweep was also limited by the
more conservative general approach to jurisdiction announced in Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S.
235 (1958)).
16. See generally Martin B. Louis, The Grasp Of Long Arm Jurisdiction Finally Exceeds Its
Reach: A Comment On World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson And Rush v. Savchuk, 58
N.C. L. Ray. 407, 408-22 (1980) (noting the Court's seventeen-year period of silence and review-
ing the cases that broke this silence).
17. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
18. Baxter v. Mouzavires, 455 U.S. 1006 (1982); Chelsea House Publishers v. Nicholstone
Book Bindery, Inc., 455 U.S. 994 (1982); Lakeside Bridge & Steel Co. v. Mountain State Constr.
Co., 445 U.S. 907 (1980). In each of these cases, which involved attempts to obtain jurisdiction
over nonresident buyers, Justice White dissented from the denial of certiorari. Justice Powell
joined Justice White in all three dissents; Chief Justice Burger joined in the Chelsea House
dissent.
19. 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
20. See infra text accompanying notes 178-83.
21. The only other recent Supreme Court cases upholding a state's assertion of jurisdiction
are Burnham v. Superior Court, 110 S. Ct. 2105, 2119 (1990), a tag jurisdiction case, and two
companion libel cases, Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 781 (1984), and Calder v.
Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789-91 (1984). A partisan might point out that the Court recently returned to
its anti-plaintiff ways in Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 111 S. Ct. 1522, 1528 (1991) (up-
holding a choice of forum clause against a consumer plaintiff). Moreover, the cynic might note
that in most of these recent Supreme Court decisions upholding jurisdiction, the defendant was an
individual; the only corporate defendant to lose was Hustler Magazine.
22. Justice Brennan joined in the dissenting opinion of Justice Black in Hanson v. Denckla,
357 U.S. 235, 259 (1958), in which they first set forth their interest analysis approach to jurisdic-
tion. Justice Brennan has reasserted this jurisdictional approach in numerous dissenting opinions
to Supreme Court decisions striking down a state's assertion of jurisdiction. E.g., Asahi Metal
Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 116 (1987); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Wood-
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is not the definitive contract decision we had hoped for, and it sheds only a
little more light on the basic problem than its predecessors, the aforemen-
tioned insurance cases.3
Those seeking further judiciaF explication of this question might look
to the many decisions of the lower federal courts and state appellate courts.
A thorough distillation of these cases, however, would demand a Herculean
effort given the number of cases and courts and the variety of long-arm
provisions involved. Moreover, jurisdictional opinions are uniquely
opaque. Many rely heavily upon the cut-and-paste style of opinion writing
and some are so chock-full of familiar jurisdictional quotes and clich6s that
often one must look hard to find an original sentence, let alone an original
idea.
In the absence of an obvious starting point, I shall begin with the al-
leged distinction between single contract and tort cases. After demonstrat-
ing that the distinction is more factual than doctrinal, I shall develop, and
apply to a number of familiar paradigms, a functional analysis of jurisdic-
tion over promisors. I shall conclude with an examination of the Burger
King decision and its potential impact upon the general field.
II. COMPARING JURISDICTION OVER ToRTEAsoRs AND PROMISORS
A few examples demonstrate that the supposed difference between ju-
risdiction over tortfeasors and promisors is more factual than doctrinal and
that analogous situations normally lead to identical results. In the first ex-
son, 444 U.S. 286, 299 (1980). The focal point of Justice Brennan's disagreement with the major-
ity was the importance assigned to the interests of the plaintiff and the forum state in asserting
jurisdiction over the defendant. E.g., World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 299-300 (setting forth
the interest of the forum state and the injured plaintiff in obtaining jurisdiction over the foreign
sellers of an allegedly defective product involved in a local accident). Justice Brennan would
have balanced these interests against the defendants' contacts with the forum. Id. The majority
insisted first on a finding of minimum contacts by the defendants. Id. at 299. The interests of the
plaintiff and the forum state then became relevant as a way of confirming or rejecting, but never
creating, jurisdiction. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 116 (1987) (unanimously denying jurisdiction on the
basis of these other interests).
23. See supra text accompanying notes 12-15.
24. Despite the wealth of academic writing about jurisdiction, most of it is theoretical and
very little addresses the contract question directly. Only a small group of law review notes that
appeared about a decade ago in response to the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari in a few
single contract cases, see supra note 18, have attempted to treat the subject directly or systemati-
cally. See, e.g., Gentile, supra note 14; Matthew Schultz, Note, Minimum Contacts in Contract
Cases: A Forward Looking Evaluation, 58 NoTRE DAME L. Ray. 635 (1983); Lynne F. Siegel,
Note, Lakeside Bridge & Steel Co. v. Mountain State Construction Co.: Inflexible Application of
Long-Arm Jurisdiction Standards to the Nonresident Purchaser, 75 Nw. U. L. Rav. 345 (1980).
A broader contemporaneous treatment of jurisdictional issues, including contracts, is found in
Mark P. Gergen, Comment, Constitutional Limitations on State Long-Arm Jurisdiction, 49 U. Cm.
L. REv. 156 (1982). An earlier treatment of contracts is found in Developments, supra note 11, at
926-28.
1993]
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ample, a homeowner living near the state line discovers several leaks in his
roof just as he receives news of an approaching storm. By telephone he
engages a nearby, out-of-state roofing company to make the necessary re-
pairs, but the work is done poorly and his home suffers water damage from
the storm. Courts in the homeowner's state clearly can obtain jurisdiction
over the nonresident roofing company-regardless of whether the claim
sounds in negligence, breach of warranty, or breach of the contract to re-
pair-principally because the claim arose out of the defendant's liabil-
ity-creating activity within the forum state.' The decisive jurisdictional
factor, then, is not the legal theory of the claim but its factual relationship to
the forum state.26
Consider instead that the roofing company broke its promise to come
and fix the roof, that the homeowner could not obtain a substitute roofer in
time, and that again his home was damaged by the storm. The roofing
company's amenability to local jurisdiction is now less certain, not because
the claim must sound in contract but because the claim does not arise out of
local activity. Jurisdiction in this case must be founded on the defendant's
unfulfilled promise to perform a contract within the state. 27 Some long-arm
25. This example is based on the facts of Smyth v. Twin State Improvement Corp., 80 A.2d
664, 665 (Vt 1951), which upheld local jurisdiction against an out-of-state roofing company
under a long-arm statute purporting to reach both local single torts and contracts. Because of
International Shoe's distinction between single torts and contracts, see supra text accompanying
notes 6-7, the Vermont Supreme Court limited its discussion to the former. Smyth, 80 A.2d at
666. The Court's jurisdictional justifications, however-local evidence, witnesses, and interest-
are equally applicable to a claim in contract. Curiously, there is no well known early case specifi-
cally founding jurisdiction upon a deficient local performance of a single contract, but several
early contract cases go even farther. Thus, in Compania de Astral, S.A. v. Boston Metals Co., 107
A.2d 357, 367, 369 (Md. 1954), local jurisdiction was upheld over a nonresident buyer who
breached a contract to purchase ships located in Baltimore Harbor after viewing the ships there,
negotiating there, and partially performing there by opening an escrow account in a local bank. In
National Gas Appliance Corp. v. AB Electrolux, 270 F.2d 472, 475 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. denied,
361 U.S. 959 (1960), a Swedish corporation was subjected to jurisdiction in Chicago for its breach
of an executory contract, in large part because its engineer had twice gone to Chicago to sell the
plaintiff on the deal.
Today many long-arm statutes assert jurisdiction over those who perform a contract within
the forum state. E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-75.4(5)b (1992) (providing that jurisdiction "[a]rises
out of services actually performed for the plaintiff by the defendant within this State").
26. As previously noted, some courts and commentators apparently would extend jurisdiction
a little more liberally in cases of injury to persons or property. See supra note 11. Other courts
and commentators find the distinction to be specious or to justify, at best, only a thumb on the
scale in close cases. See Siegel, supra note 24, at 355; Note, Revision of the Maryland Foreign
Corporation Law: An Advance, 38 COLUM. L. REv. 1060, 1078 (1938) (concluding that in serving
the state interest in giving jurisdictional protection to its residents, "there could surely be no
distinction between the causing of tort or of contractual harm").
27. In Bowman v. Curt G. Joa, Inc., 361 F.2d 706,708-09,716 (4th Cir. 1966), the court held
that the long-arm statute did not reach a foreign corporation that defaulted on a single contract to
manufacture an expensive machine for local plaintiffs, despite some visits by defendant's agents
to the forum state to negotiate the contract. Id. at 709. Some cases suggest that one who inten-
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statutes specifically cover this situation," even though due process argua-
bly requires that a defendant have additional forum contacts-e.g., other
local customers or local solicitation for such business.29 Many tort
long-arm provisions analogously require additional contacts when the
wrongful act took place outside the state.
30
The difficulty of obtaining jurisdiction over those who break a promise
to perform locally may be a reason for the perception that jurisdiction over
promisors in general is especially difficult to establish. The difficulty, how-
ever, is more factual than doctrinal. From outside a forum-and without
tionally enters into a contract with a resident of the forum state thereby submits to local jurisdic-
tion, even though she has no other contacts with the forum state. E.g., Prcduct Promotions, Inc. v.
Cousteau, 495 F.2d 483, 494-96 (5th Cir. 1974) (upholding Texas jurisdiction over a foreign
corporation that had entered into a single contract with a Texas resident, even though the defend-
ant's performance took place outside of Texas and the defendant had no other local contracts).
Such courts apparently would ignore the fact that the defendant had defaulted on the contract
before performance occurred. Other courts have rejected this broad jurisdictional approach, which
apparently would reach even mail-order, consumer buyers, and small businesses calling in single
orders from inventory. See In-Flight Devices Corp. v. Van Dusen Air, Inc., 466 F.2d 220, 227
n.13 (6th Cir. 1972). In Burger King, Justice Brennan stated that "[i]f the question is whether an
individual's contract with an out-of-state party alone can automatically establish sufficient mini-
mum contacts in the other party's home forum, we believe the answer clearly is that it cannot."
Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 478 (1985).
28. E.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-308(b)(5) (1992) (asserting jurisdiction over any party
"[e]ntering into an express or implied contract, by mail or otherwise, with a resident of this state
to be performed in whole or in part by either party in this state"); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-75.4(5)
(1992) (asserting jurisdiction "[iun any action which ... [a]rises out of a promise, made any-
where to the plaintiff... by the defendant to perform services within this State"); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 20-2-214(5) (1993) (asserting jurisdiction over any person "[e]ntering into a contract for
services to be rendered or for materials to be furnished in this state"); TEx. Crv. PRAc. & Rnm.
CODE ANN. § 17.042(1) (West 1993) (providing that the state has jurisdiction when the defendant
"contracts by mall or otherwise with a Texas resident and either party is to perform the contract in
whole or in part in this state"); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 801.05(5) (West 1993) (using same language as
North Carolina statute).
29. See supra note 2. The fact that the out-of-state roofing company was called and agreed
to do the work suggests that it had undertaken other local work previously and had advertised
locally. Suppose that the company neither had solicited nor done local work, that the homeowner
had called in desperation because he could not obtain the timely services of a local roofer, and that
as a favor the company had agreed in good faith to come, but failed to do so when the only
available truck broke down. In an extreme fact situation such as this, in which there is a broken
promise to perform locally by a non-aggressor promisor having no other contacts with the forum,
the existence of local jurisdiction against the company is most questionable. Indeed, a claim of
jurisdiction on these facts almost amounts to an assertion of the now rejected proposition that the
mere making of a contract with a forum resident constitutes a consent to jurisdiction. See supra
note 27.
30. For example, the Oklahoma long-arm statute applied in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp.
v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 290 n.7 (1980), provided that for a tortious injury caused by "an act or
omission outside this state" to constitute grounds for jurisdiction, the wrongdoer must have "regu-
larly do[ne] or solicit[ed] business or engage[ed] in any other persistent course of conduct, or
derive[d] substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered, in this state."
OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1701.03(a)(4) (1971) (repealed 1984).
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sending goods or things therein-it is probably easier and more common to
make and breach a contract than to commit a tort.3 ' Hence, these more
problematic jurisdictional cases more often will involve promisors than
tortfeasors.
In a second example of conduct that can generate both tort and con-
tract claims, a nonresident seller sends into the state goods that the buyer
alleges to be defective, non-conforming, unfit for their intended use, or not
as specifically warranted. Such sellers normally are amenable to local juris-
diction, regardless of whether the goods caused personal injury, property
damage, or economic loss or the claim asserted against the seller sounds in
contract or tort.3 2 Exceptions may arise when only a single item or ship-
ment of goods is involved and its arrival is outside the normal course of the
defendant's business,33 but such exceptions are a function of the paucity of
jurisdictional contacts rather than the legal theory of the plaintiff's claim for
relief. In these more difficult jurisdictional cases, a claim for breach of
contract and economic loss naturally might attract somewhat less judicial
sympathy than a claim for personal injury. From an analytical perspective,
however, the two situations are essentially the same and ordinarily should
be treated alike.34
Conversely, purchasers of goods shipped to them from outside the
state often refuse the goods or fail to pay for them and eventually are sued
for breach of contract in the seller's home state. Jurisdiction over these
purchasers, who typically order by mail or telephone, is sometimes upheld
and sometimes denied. The results seem to turn on such factors as the size,
scope, frequency, and source of the transaction(s), on whether the goods
were specially manufactured or obtained for the buyer, on whether the
buyer is a consumer or a business person, and on whether the buyer entered
31. Jurisdictional theorists posit the example of persons who fire bullets or other missiles
across state lines, who release pollutants into the air near state borders or into interstate rivers, or
who knowingly send fraudulent or defamatory papers or dangerous objects into another state.
Although such persons have not entered the forum, they have committed an act that intentionally
causes actionable effects within the forum state. Such an act is regarded as a sufficient contact to
sustain local jurisdiction. REs-rATmMENT (SacoNm) OF Corcipucr OF LAws § 37 cmt. a (1971); see
Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 785-91 (1984) (upholding local jurisdiction over authors of a
libelous publication intentionally and expressly aimed at plaintiff's forum); cf. Kulko v. Superior
Court, 436 U.S. 84, 94 (1978) (distinguishing these intentional tort paradigms from, and rejecting
the application of the effects test to, a father who sent his child into the forum state, which then
might provide governmental services to the child). The application of the effects test to contract
cases is difficult because the conduct, although intentional, does not produce a tangible missile or
pollutant that physically enters the forum. At worst, the breach of contract produces rippling
economic effects that do not require a specific physical presence within the forum state.
32. See infra text accompanying notes 113-14.
33. See infra text accompanying notes 115-19.
34. See supra note 26.
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the state in connection with this or related transactions. 35 The willingness
of courts to deny jurisdiction over the purchaser in many of these cases is
probably another major source of the perception that jurisdiction over
promisors is more difficult to obtain. Again, the explanation is not found in
the legal theory of the claim, which of necessity is breach of contract, but in
the fact that such cases frequently involve single transactions and nonresi-
dent purchasers, both commercial and consumer, who have not personally
entered the forum state.
36
In sum, jurisdiction over the person in both tort and contract cases is
readily established when the claim arises out of the personal activities of the
defendant within the forum state or out of the regular shipment of defend-
ant's goods into, or the plaintiff's goods out of,37 the forum state. Jurisdic-
tion is much more difficult to establish if the defendant has not personally
entered the state, the defendant's contacts with the state are few or irregular,
and the defendant is a purchaser, particularly a consumer-purchaser.
38
These conclusions should put to rest any lingering notions that jurisdiction
over promisors is doctrinally different or more demanding. They also sug-
gest that although jurisdictional contacts may arise out of almost any com-
mercial activity, the strongest contacts are those provided by the local
performance of a contract, the natural starting point for the promised func-
tional analysis.
III. A FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS OF CONTRACrUAL
JURISDICTIONAL PARADIGMS
A. Personal Performance by the Promisor Within the Forum State
The strongest case for jurisdiction over a promisor is a local, personal
performance that allegedly fell short of what was promised.39 Such a per-
35. See infra text accompanying notes 106-12 (suggesting that regular commercial buyers are
subject to jurisdiction in the seller's forum, that mail-order consumer purchasers are not, and that
one-shot commercial buyer cases divide the courts); see also Russell J. Weintraub, An Objective
Basis For Rejecting Transient Jurisdiction, 22 RuTGERs L. 611, 625-26 (1991) (suggesting juris-
diction over buyers in the seller's home state turns on such questions as whether the goods were "a
catalogue item or custom made"; whether "an officer of the buyer entered the forum to negotiate
the contract or supervise manufacture; "whether the buyer or seller was the aggressor or first
person to solicit the business; whether the "contract required] manufacture" within the forum
state; and whether the buyer previously had purchased from the seller).
36. E.g., In-Flight Devices Corp. v. Van Dusen Air, Inc., 466 F.2d 220, 232 (6th Cir. 1972)
(asserting the need to protect passive mail-order purchaser-consumers from assertions ofjurisdic-
tion by nonresident corporate mail-order sellers).
37. Of course if the buyer has made only a single purchase or is a mail-order pur-
chaser-consumer, her amenability to jurisdiction is more doubtful. See supra text accompanying
notes 35-36.
38. See supra note 30; infra notes 115-19 and accompanying text.
39. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
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formance should support jurisdiction even though the plaintiff is not a local
resident,40 and the defendant has no other dealings with the plaintiff or
others within the forum state. To explain or justify this result, it is not
necessary to develop a coherent, overall theory of personal jurisdiction,41
particularly a theory centering on the importance of territoriality. 42 On the
other hand, it would not be sufficient to assert merely that the defendant
accepted the benefits and protection of the forum state by performing
there.43 Perhaps it is sufficient to note that (1) in most cases it will be less
burdensome for a nonresident promisor who performed locally to return to
answer for the performance's alleged shortcomings" than for the promisee
to sue the promisor elsewhere;45 (2) the performance often will occur in a
commercial context in which the parties can anticipate and budget for
out-of-state litigation; (3) evidence and witnesses to the alleged inadequacy
of the defendant's performance most likely can be found where the per-
formance occurred;46 and (4) the law of the jurisdiction in which the per-
formance occurred typically will supply the legal framework against which
the performance's alleged inadequacy will be measured.47 In short, it gen-
erally will be fairer and more efficient to require the promisor to defend her
40. In most single contract cases the plaintiff is a local resident, a fact that should be legally
irrelevant. E.g., Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 332 (1980). Long-arm provisions asserting juris-
diction over persons who perform services for the plaintiff within the state do not require a con-
nection between the plaintiff and the forum state. E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-75.4(5)(b) (1992)
(asserting jurisdiction when a contact "[a]rises out of services actually performed for the plaintiff
by the defendant within this State"). Such statutes, and the cases, see supra note 25, make it clear
that a single local performance will supply the minimum contacts.
41. The Supreme Court's current interest in jurisdiction predictably has generated a spate of
scholarly discourse, most of which has sought to develop a coherent theory of personal jurisdic-
tion. See, e.g., Symposium, The Future of Personal Jurisdiction: A Symposium on Burnham v.
Superior Court, 22 RuTGERs L.J. 559 (1991). Despite the size of this effort and the academic
pedigrees of most of the participants, neither success nor consensus has been achieved. No the-
ory, point of view, article, or scholar has emerged as the leader or the first among equals. By
contrast, recall Professor Ely's belated, but triumphant, entry into the great Erie debate. John Hart
Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARrv. L. REv. 693 (1974).
42. See Arthur M. Weisburd, Territorial Authority and Personal Jurisdiction, 63 WASH. U.
L.Q. 377, 378-79 (1985) (offering a territorial view of personal jurisdiction).
43. The "benefits and protection" cliche, which so permeates threshold levels of jurisdic-
tional discussion, was thrust upon an obviously receptive world at the end of International Shoe
Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945). Almost a half century later, the clich6 was promi-
nently featured in Justice Brennan's concurring opinion in Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S.
604, 637-38 (1990). Ultimately, this clich6 implies that anyone who is in a position to, or may
have a need to, make use of a state's laws, institutions, or services-most of which the state
cannot constitutionally deny an American citizen anyway-is thereby amenable to, or impliedly
has consented to, the jurisdiction of the state. Either the clich6 suggests too much, or nothing at
all.
44. Smyth v. Twin State Improvement Corp., 80 A.2d 664, 667 (Vt. 1951).




performance in the state in which it occurred than to require the disap-
pointed promisee to litigate elsewhere, typically in a state that enjoys gen-
eral jurisdiction over the promisor but otherwise has no connection with the
subject matter of the dispute.
Technology has created its own set of jurisdictional issues in this con-
text. The mails and modem electronic communication devices like the tele-
phone, fax, television, and videotape make it increasingly possible to
perform locally without personally entering the forum state. For example,
speakers, pollsters, fund-raisers, lawyers, lobbyists, and public relations
practitioners can sometimes perform from afar electronically or by mail.
These persons probably would be subject to local jurisdiction if their remote
performances were part of a larger commercial enterprise with other local
contacts. 48 Moreover, the forum state will probably apply its own law to
measure the adequacy of the performance49 and should be home to impor-
tant witnesses, particularly the persons whom the defendant addressed or
contacted. But what if the performance in question consisted of only a few
interstate letters or telephone calls? Such a limited local effort does not
strongly suggest that the defendant can, or fairly must, return to answer for
this performance.
An analogous situation occurs when a nonresident arranges to bid at a
local auction through an open, long distance telephone line, submits, but
later reneges on, the winning bid, and is sued locally by the auction house.
In Parke-Bernet Galleries, Inc. v. Franklyn'° the New York Court of Ap-
peals upheld jurisdiction over this kind of promisor, even though the auc-
tion house had initiated the dealings by mailing the defendant an auction
catalog, only a single transaction was involved, and the defendant had not
personally entered the state. The court reasoned that this case fell between
those in which the defendant was physically present within the state, cases
in which jurisdiction generally is upheld, and those in which the defendant
telephoned a single order for goods into the state, cases in which jurisdic-
48. In Alchemie Int'l, Inc. v. Metal World, Inc., 523 F. Supp. 1039 (D.NJ. 1981), the court,
in upholding jurisdiction over a nonresident corporation that had breached a substantial commer-
cial contract, stated: "I see little to distinguish a corporation's using the telephone and mail to
solicit and negotiate a contract the size of that at issue here from that same corporation sending an
agent into the state in pursuit of the identical contract from the identical buyer." Id. at 1050. In
Alchemie, the telephone and mail were used to solicit or negotiate the contract. Cases in which
such devices are the means by which the contract is performed are much rarer. E.g., Parke-Bernet
Galleries, Inc. v. Franklyn, 256 N.E.2d 506, 509 (N.Y. 1970) (upholding jurisdiction over a non-
resident defendant who had made a successful auction bid over the telephone).
49. Long ago the Supreme Court held that a forum whose law applies does not ipso facto also
have jurisdiction over the person. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 254 (1958). Nevertheless,
the choice of law question remains a relevant jurisdictional factor once minimum contacts are
found to exist. See Louis, supra note 16, at 421.
50. 256 N.E.2d 506, 508 (N.Y. 1970).
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tion often is denied.51 The court then distinguished the single-order tele-
phone buyer from the defendant auction bidder on the ground that the latter
had projected himself by telephone into the auction room and affected those
present.5 2 This distinction is not persuasive. The single-order telephone
buyer achieves the same result as a buyer personally present in the store,
but is not equally amenable to local jurisdiction .5  The telephone buyer,
however, often can initiate and complete a purchase in a few moments,
whereas a person who seeks to bid by telephone at an auction presumably
must make complicated arrangements in advance. The latter's contacts with
the forum state, therefore, appear to be more substantial than the contacts of
the former. Moreover, although the auction bidder may be a consumer, he
is likely to be affluent and sophisticated and understand the legal conse-
quences of his actions.
Parke-Bernet offered an alternative justification for upholding jurisdic-
tion. The court noted that an auction house employee had been assigned to
the defendant's open line during the bidding and that this employee not
only had made the defendant's bids but also had advised the defendant of
the bids of others.54 This employee, therefore, acted as a borrowed servant
or agent whose activities within the forum state had effectively located the
defendant there. 5 This mechanical, but not unpersuasive, approach serves
to introduce a line of cases in which a defendant is subject to jurisdiction
because of a local performance by an agent or servant who also happens to
be the plaintiff in the action. In these cases the plaintiff typically is a local
agent for the defendant 6 or is engaged by the defendant to perform a local
service.57 When the plaintiff fails to receive his salary, commissions, or
51. Id. at 507-08. The court cited Katz & Son Billiard Prod., Inc. v. Correale & Sons, Inc.,
232 N.E.2d 864 (N.Y. 1967), as its single telephone order case. However, the single order in that
case was part of a continuing business relationship between a New Jersey telephone-ordering
defendant and a New York seller. Id. at 864-65. Many courts today presumably would find juris-
diction on such facts. See supra note 7. A more likely situation for denying jurisdiction is when
the buyer is a consumer making a single order for goods by mail or telephone. Courts tend to
agree that jurisdiction over this type of buyer should be denied. See supra note 37.
52. Parke.Bernet, 256 N.E.2d at 507-08.
53. See supra note 37; infra note 85.
54. Parke-Bernet, 256 N.E.2d at 509.
55. Id.
56. E.g., Goldman v. Parkland of Dallas, Inc., 176 S.E.2d 784, 785-86, 788-89 (N.C. 1970)
(upholding jurisdiction over a nonresident dress manufacturer sued for commissions by its local
sales representative).
57. Gualtieri v. Burleson, 353 S.E.2d 652, 654-56 (N.C. App.), disc. review denied, 358
S.E.2d 50 (N.C. 1987) (holding that a nonresident attorney who hired a local physician by tele-
phone to be expert witness in foreign litigation is now subject to local jurisdiction in an action by
the physician, who prepared locally, to collect his fee); Forman & Zuckerman, P.A. v. Schupak,
228 S.E.2d 503, 504-06 (N.C. App. 1976) (holding that nonresident attorneys who hired local
attorneys to bring a lawsuit are subject to local jurisdiction in an action to recover legal fees for
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fees for the agreed-upon local performance, he sues the defendant locally,
claiming that his performance within the forum state at the defendant's re-
quest and for her benefit subjects the defendant to jurisdiction there. Juris-
diction is typically upheld in such cases. It is not unfair to make a
defendant answer for a performance within the forum state for which she
contracted and from which she sought to benefit.5" In addition, local law
and local witnesses are again likely to be important, if not decisive. More-
over, in many of these cases the underlying transaction is substantial, con-
tinuing, and commercial, and the parties, particularly the defendant, are not
unsophisticated consumers. All this serves to make the promisor's connec-
tion with the state so substantial and purposeful that it does not offend due
process to make her litigate there. Crowning that conclusion with the argu-
ment that she performed within the state through her agent may be forensi-
cally appealing but adds very little to the argument's real weight.
B. Failure to Perform as Promised Within the Forum
Earlier in this Article I discussed the jurisdictional exposure of an
out-of-state roofing company that broke a single promise to perform lo-
cally.5 9 That discussion introduced most of the general conclusions that can
be drawn from this paradigm. First, jurisdiction cannot be founded solely
on the fact that the promisee was a resident of the forum state6° or that the
contract could have been accepted and therefore "made" within the forum
state.6 Second, a promise to perform within the forum state normally does
not occur in isolation. Typically, the promise is locally negotiated or solic-
the litigation), appeal dismissed, 233 S.E.2d 391 (N.C.), appeal dismissed, 434 U.S. 804 (1977);
Zerbel v. H.L. Federman & Co., 179 N.W.2d 872, 874 (Wis. 1970) (holding that a nonresident
defendant who asked a local plaintiff to prepare a financial report was thereby subject to local
jurisdiction), appeal dismissed, 402 U.S. 902 (1971). But see Anderson v. Shiflett, 435 F.2d 1036,
1037-38 (10th Cir. 1971) (concluding that an Oklahoma architect who performed substantial pre-
liminary professional services in Oklahoma with respect to Texas projects for a Texas defendant
cannot obtain local jurisdiction over the Texan); Orton v. Woods Oil & Gas Co., 249 F.2d 198,
199-202 (7th Cir. 1957) (holding that a local attorney and business consultant cannot obtain local
jurisdiction over a foreign corporation for locally-performed professional services); U-Anchor Ad-
vertising, Inc. v. Burt, 553 S.W.2d 760, 761-64 (Tex. 1977) (finding that an Oklahoma business
which arranged for highway advertising displays in Texas while still in Oklahoma was not subject
to jurisdiction in Texas for abandoning the contract), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1063 (1978).
58. The North Carolina long-arm statute specifically provides for jurisdiction in any action
that arises "out of a promise, made anywhere to the plaintiff... by the defendant.., to pay for
services to be performed in this State by the plaintiff." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-75.4(5)(a) (1992).
59. See supra text accompanying notes 27-30.
60. See supra note 27.
61. In Burger King, Justice Brennan stated that "[tihe Court long ago rejected the notion that
personal jurisdiction might turn on 'mechanical' tests, or on 'conceptualistic ... theories of the
place of contracting or of performance."' Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 478
(1985) (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
1993]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
ited, either specifically or as part of a general effort to obtain such local
business, or it involves business that the promisor previously has done with
the promisee or similarly situated persons.62 In such cases the true basis of
jurisdiction is the actual or attempted transaction of business within the
state, rather than the mere making of a promise to perform within the state.
Third, when a nonresident's promise to perform locally does occur in isola-
tion or outside the promisor's regular course of business, it may still fall
within the terms of many long-arm provisions, 63 but arguably it does not
itself provide the constitutionally necessary minimum contacts." t Such a
result is consistent with foreign act, local injury long-arm provisions, which
typically require a transactional nexus with the forum state beyond the mere
local presence of the injury-causing product, and with contract cases hold-
ing that a single, isolated shipment of goods into the state does not subject
the seller to jurisdiction there.65 In these two analogous situations, the
cause of action arises from a local physical contact, the shipment by a non-
resident defendant of the offending product into the state. If that physical
act does not itself provide the minimum contacts, even when personal in-
jury results, then the mere making of a promise to perform locally also
should not. This is true even though both the shipment and the promise are
directed specifically at the forum state.66 Perhaps the promise to perform
locally suggests more readily than a single shipment of products that a jour-
ney to the forum to litigate would not be onerous. Due process, however,
requires more than a lack of inconvenience; it requires that a defendant have
minimum contacts with the forum-which a single, isolated broken promise
to perform locally arguably cannot supply.
62. In the out-of-state roofer hypothetical, for example, it was likely that the defendant
served other local customers and solicited local business through advertisements, listings in local
directories, and word-of-mouth recommendations. Thus, what appeared at first blush to be just a
broken promise by the defendant to come and repair a roof was, in fact, a representative part of the
defendant's transaction of local business.
63. See supra note 28.
64. See supra text accompanying notes 28-30. But see Gardner Eng'g Corp. v. Page Eng'g
Co., 484 F.2d 27, 28-32 (8th Cir. 1973) (finding defendant subject to jurisdiction in Arkansas for
anticipatory breach of a contract to supply goods to a construction project there).
65. See infra text accompanying notes 115-19 (single contract cases); supra note 30 (foreign
act, local injury statute).
66. Third persons acting independently sometimes send or carry goods into a state in which
the goods normally are not sold and with which the manufacturer or original seller of the goods
otherwise has little or no contact. E.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S.
286, 295 (1980) (involving a car that was sold to the plaintiff by the defendant in New York, and
was driven to Oklahoma where a defect caused injury to plaintiff); Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior
Court, 458 P.2d 57, 61, 67 (Cal. 1969) (involving a defective pressure tank manufactured by
defendant that somehow arrived in California, where eventually it exploded; jurisdiction was up-
held only because defendant regularly sold a different model of pressure tank to another California




C. Jurisdiction Over Promisors Who Perform Outside the Forum
For additional insight into the question of performance within the fo-
rum state, a claim of jurisdiction by a forum in which performance clearly
did not or was not to occur should be considered. In Helzberg's Diamond
Shops, Inc. v. Valley West Des Moines Shopping Center, Inc.,67 the plain-
tiff, Helzberg's, a Missouri corporation, operated a chain of jewelry stores
including one in the defendant's Iowa shopping mall. IHelzberg's sought to
enjoin the defendant in a Missouri court from leasing space in the Iowa mall
to another jewelry store named Lord's in violation of a restrictive covenant
in the plaintiff's lease.68 The trial court denied the defendant's motion to
dismiss for failure to join Lord's as an indispensable party not subject to
jurisdiction in Missouri and granted the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary
injunction. The defendant appealed the grant of the injunction6 9 and unsuc-
cessfully challenged the ruling on its indispensable party contention. The
case is of interest because the basis for the Missouri court's assumption of
jurisdiction over the defendant is less than obvious7° and a holding that
jurisdiction-or venue7 -was absent, or that a transfer of venue was ap-
propriate,72 easily would have obviated the indispensable party problem.
Unfortunately, the opinion of the court of appeals neither mentions a juris-
dictional challenge by the defendant nor sets forth the factual basis for the
trial court's assumption of jurisdiction.
The lack of a real factual basis for jurisdiction over Valley West's
person invites fictive speculation. Let us assume that Valley West, which
sought tenants for its mall and knew that a midwester chain store operation
like Helzberg's was a prospect, initially solicited Helzberg's in Missouri by
mail or telephone. Thereafter representatives of Valley West came to Mis-
souri to persuade, to negotiate, and finally to sign the lease. Thus, the de-
fendant solicited and negotiated in Missouri by mail, telephone, and
personal entry, "made" and personally signed the contract in Missouri, and
entered into a substantial and continuing commercial relationship with a
67. 564 F.2d 816 (8th Cir. 1977).
68. l at 817.
69. Id. at 817-18.
70. Except for its contractual relationship with a Missouri corporation, Valley West had no
reported or apparent connection whatsoever with the state of Missouri.
71. Venue in federal district court over this foreign corporation presumably was founded on
the allegation that the defendant corporation was "doing business" in Missouri. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1391(c) (1976) (repealed 1976). An allegation that the claim "arose!' in Missouri under 28
U.S.C. § 1391(a) (1976) (amended 1990) was unlikely since the allegedly offending lease to
Lord's was made in and to be performed in Iowa.
72. "[F]or the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court
may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought."
28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1988).
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Missouri corporation. Many courts would view these contacts together as
easily exceeding the requisite minimum, even though the lease was to be
performed primarily in Iowa.7 3
What is most intriguing about this jurisdictional hypothetical is not the
sum of the possible contacts-although that represents the easiest and most
popular approach to such jurisdictional questions-but their individual sig-
nificance. For example, many courts historically have placed great jurisdic-
tional emphasis on the place where the contract technically was "made." 74
Although that circumstance alone no longer can be a sufficient basis for
jurisdiction,7" it continues to be a likely forum if solicitation, negotiation, or
part performance also occurred there. If that forum is not also the place of
performance, it becomes an alternative forum where disputes about the
quality of a contract's performance may be litigated. Moreover, the choice
of forum then could be the result of a race to the courthouse door.76 The
73. Cf. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 487 (1985) (emphasizing the sub-
stantial and continuing commercial relationship between the contracting parties). The comment to
the California all-purpose long-arm provision contains the following relevant statement:
So, for example, a state may not exercise judicial jurisdiction over an individual as to a
cause of action for breach of contract merely because he happened to affix his signature
to the contract within its territory. There is a stronger case for the exercise of such
jurisdiction if the signing of the contract was the culmination of a series of acts carried
on by the individual in its territory. And the state clearly may exercise jurisdiction if the
signing of the contract resulted from activities of a sufficient intensity to amount to the
doing of business.
CAL. Civ. PROc. CODE § 410.10 cmt. 8 (West 1973).
74. E.g., Goldman v. Parkland of Dallas, Inc., 176 S.E.2d 784, 788-89 (N.C. 1970) (empha-
sizing the technical making of the contract within the state while noting that defendant's perform-
ance also had taken place within the state).
75. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 478 (rejecting the notion that personal jurisdiction might turn
on a technical determination of where the contract was made); see also Lakeside Bridge & Steel
Co. v. Mountain State Constr. Co., Inc., 597 F.2d 596, 603-04 (7th Cir. 1979) (rejecting as not
controlling the "formalities of contract execution"; also rejecting as not controlling a contract term
providing that the goods were to be shipped F.O.B. sellers plant and that title, therefore, had
passed to the defendant buyer within the forum state), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 907 (1980). Some
cases have suggested, however, that F.O.B. shipping point clauses locate a defendant's property
within the forum state, the benefits and protection of which the defendant thereby enjoys.
Agrashell, Inc. v. Bernard Sirotta Co., 344 F.2d 583, 588-89 (2d Cir. 1965). But see Gentile,
supra note 14, at 386-87.
76. When several forums potentially have jurisdiction over a contract dispute and equity or a
declaratory judgment statute makes it possible for the promisor, who ordinarily would be the
defendant, also to initiate the litigation, then whoever sues first will get to choose the forum. If
this person chooses his home forum, he could face, but would probably expect to defeat, a motion
by the defendant to transfer the action's venue, see supra note 72, or to dismiss because of an
inconvenient forum. E.g., Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 261 (1981) (holding that an
American court was an inconvenient forum to litigate wrongful death actions arising out of an
airplane crash in Scotland). Because federal courts may transfer an action's venue to another
state, they dismiss on grounds of forum non conveniens only when the convenient forum is in
another country or, in very unusual circumstances, in a state court. Id.
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Helzberg's case is different because the dispute therein arose outside the
forum state and involved a third person, probably an indispensable party,
with no connection to the forum state." The difficulty could have been
eliminated, however, by a venue transfer motion, or its equivalent. On the
other hand, local courts are not inclined to transfer or dismiss local plain-
tiffs,78 and few cases have held that a less desirable forum with which the
defendant has minimum contacts should be constitutionally compelled to
surrender jurisdiction to a more desirable forum.7 9
In our fictive scenario, Valley West also was the aggressor in the
events that brought the parties together and employed the telephone, the
mails, and locally present agents or employees to solicit, negotiate and sign
the lease. Many courts are quick to name the party who initiated the trans-
action the aggressor,80 even though the choice is sometimes less than obvi-
ous.f8 A buyer often will appear to have made the first contact, even
though he acted in response to an earlier solicitation or advertisement by the
77. Helzberg's Diamond Shops, Inc. v. Valley West Des Moines Shopping Ctr., Inc., 564
F.2d 816, 817 (8th Cir. 1977); see also Richard D. Freer, Rethinking Compulsory Joinder: A
Proposal to Restructure Federal Rule 19,60 N.Y.U. L. Rnv. 1061, 1090, 1094-96 (1985) (arguing
that the Helzberg's case is one of the few in which a missing defendant properly should be re-
garded as an indispensable party).
78. As suggested above, see supra note 76, local judges generally are not inclined to transfer
cases brought by resident plaintiffs. See CHARLEs A. WRiGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACnCE AN
PROCEDURE § 3848 (2d ed. 1986) (noting the frequent statement by courts that a plaintiff's choice
of venue is to be respected and that the defendant must meet the burden of establishing that
another forum would be more convenient). However, in Igloo Prods. Corp. v. The Mounties, Inc.,
735 F. Supp. 214, 218 (S.D. Tex. 1990), the court ordered transfer from the plaintiff's forum,
which had jurisdiction under Burger King pursuant to a substantial, commercial contract between
the parties, to the forum in which the defendant's disputed performance had occurred and the
defendant had already filed a prior parallel action. And in McQuay, Inc. v. Samuel Schlosberg,
Inc., 321 F. Supp. 902, 908 (D. Minn. 1971), the court denied local jurisdiction over a New York
purchaser of expensive air conditioning equipment manufactured and sold by the Minnesota plain-
tiff. As an afterthought the court stated that it might also have transferred the venue of the case to
New York because the dispute centered around the defendant-purchaser's claim that the installed
equipment was defective and the witnesses and evidence were in New York. Id.
79. Cf. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113-14 (1987) (holding
unanimously that a California court could not constitutionally exercise jurisdiction over a foreign
third party defendant because the principal claim had been dismissed, the third party plaintiff was
a foreign corporation, and the third-party claim arose out of a contract made outside the country).
80. Lakeside Bridge & Steel Co. v. Mountain State Constr. Co., Inc., 597 F.2d 596, 598-99
(7th Cir. 1979) (rejecting jurisdiction over an out-of-state buyer whom the local seller had solic-
ited in person at the buyer's place of business), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 907 (1980); Fourth N.W.
Nat'l Bank v. Hilson Indus., Inc., 117 N.W.2d 732, 736 (Minn. 1962) (rejecting jurisdiction over
an out-of-state buyer whom the plaintiff had solicited); Conn v. Whitmore, 342 P.2d 871, 874
(Utah 1959) (same). But see Siegel, supra note 24, at 357 (noting that other courts have not found
initiation of a business transaction to be jurisdictionally dispositive).
81. In Fourth N.W. Nat'l Bank, 117 N.W.2d at 736, the nonresident buyer had initially
mailed an inquiry to the resident seller who, the court said, then seized the initiative and became
the aggressor.
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seller. Thus, a mail-order seller who blankets a region with advertisements
or catalogs should be regarded as the aggressor, even though the buyers
initiate the individual transactions. Moreover, the buyers frequently are
consumers, persons who generally are not subject to jurisdiction in the fo-
rums to which their orders are sent. 2 The aggressor's identity, therefore,
may well affect, but ordinarily should not control, the jurisdictional
determination.
83
The use of the mails or electronic communications to solicit or negoti-
ate a contract or facilitate its performance also must be regarded as a rele-
vant, but not decisive, jurisdictional contact.' Many cases suggest that a
personal appearance in the forum to solicit, negotiate or facilitate a contract
is a very significant contact.8 5 Logically, the accomplishment of such pur-
82. Numerous cases have asserted the necessity of protecting mail-order, consumer purchas-
ers from jurisdiction in the states to which their orders are mailed or telephoned, lest such persons
become the victims of unscrupulous sellers. E.g., Conn, 342 P.2d at 875 (articulating threat of
suits by mail order houses); see Siegel, supra note 24, at 359.
83. But see Lakeside Bridge, 597 F.2d at 598-99 (denying jurisdiction over a nonresident
buyer of a single, expensive custom-made item, largely because the local seller had aggressively
solicited the purchase by traveling to the buyer's place of business).
84. Compare Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985) (holding that, as
modem business is often transacted across state lines by mail and wire communications without
physical presence, the absence of physical presence is not fatal to jurisdiction if defendant has
"purposefully directed" efforts towards residents of the forum state) with Lakeside Bridge, 597
F.2d at 604 (holding that use of interstate telephone and mail service to communicate with local
forum would unfairly give jurisdiction to any place into which communications were directed).
The difference in tone between these two opinions is in part a reflection of their differing out-
comes. In Burger King, the Court upheld jurisdiction over a nonresident who had not personally
entered the forum state; in Lakeside Bridge, the court denied jurisdiction over such a person.
Together the cases suggest that mail and electronic communications are important, but not deci-
sive, jurisdictional factors.
85. E.g., Republic Int'l Corp. v. Amco Eng'rs, 516 F.2d 161, 167 (9th Cir. 1975) (upholding
jurisdiction where several of defendant's engineers visited the forum to work with plaintiff); Whit-
taker Corp. v. United Aircraft Corp., 482 F.2d 1079, 1084 (1st Cir. 1973) (upholding jurisdiction
where there were frequent visits to the forum state by defendant purchaser's servants); National
Gas Appliance Corp. v. AB Electrolux, 270 F.2d 472, 475 (7th Cir. 1959) (upholding jurisdiction
where the defendant foreign corporation allegedly breached an executory contract, largely because
defendant's engineer had twice visited the forum to sell plaintiff on the deal), cert. denied, 361
U.S. 959 (1960); Harry Winston, Inc. v. Waldfogel, 292 F. Supp. 473, 480-83 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)
(upholding local jurisdiction over a nonresident individual who allegedly purchased an expensive
diamond ring after making several local visits to the plaintiff's place of business); American Con-
tinental Import Agency v. Superior Court, 30 Cal. Rptr 654, 657 (Cal. Ct. App. 1963) (upholding
jurisdiction where a director of the foreign corporate purchaser visited the forum on four separate
occasions); Compania de Astral, S.A. v. Boston Metals Co., 107 A.2d 357, 367 (Md. 1954) (up-
holding jurisdiction over a nonresident buyer who had visited the forum to negotiate and to view
the ships that were the subject of the purchase agreement), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 943 (1955). But
see Hydrokinetics, Inc. v. Alaska Mechanical, Inc., 700 F.2d 1026, 1031-32 (5th Cir. 1983) (deny-
ing jurisdiction over the defendant purchaser of custom-manufactured machinery, even though
defendant's agents had visited plaintiff's Texas plant), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 962 (1984); Oswalt
Indus., Inc. v. Gilmore, 297 F. Supp. 307, 313 (D. Kan. 1969) (denying jurisdiction over defend-
ant purchaser who used the mail and telephone and who for unspecified purposes made a single
1993] PERSONAL JURISDICTION
poses by mail or electronic communications should be jurisdictionally im-
portant. These forms of communication have made it much easier to
contract at a distance without a personal appearance. Denying jurisdiction
in all such cases could improperly immunize persons who do business in, or
have significant commercial relations with, the forum state. 6 On the other
hand, upholding jurisdiction on the basis of a single letter or electronic
communication sent into the state obviously would sweep too far in the
other direction," particularly in cases involving mail-order con-
sumer-purchasers. 8  Even an electronic performance within the state, if
based on a single letter or telephone call, constitutes a very slender thread
upon which to hang a claim of jurisdiction.89
Mail and electronic communications also are an essential and inevita-
ble part of a substantial and continuing interstate business relationship." If
the relationship ruptures and litigation ensues in either party's home forum,
local jurisdiction will probably be sustained in terms that include a promi-
nent mention of the interstate communications. 9 Because such communi-
cations are an inevitable outgrowth of a substantial and continuing
commercial relationship, the relationship ought to be regarded as the princi-
pal contact.92
visit to the forum "initiated by plaintiff"). In Darby v. Superior Supply Co., 458 S.W.2d 423, 427
(Tenn. 1970), the court denied jurisdiction over a nonresident consumer purchaser who had or-
dered an expensive shipment of lumber from stock by mail and telephone and then hired a truck to
pick up the lumber in the forum state. Darby was limited to its facts in Nicholstone Book Bind-
ery, Inc. v. Chelsea House Publishers, 621 S.W.2d 560, 562-63 (Tenn. 1981) (limiting Darby to
cases involving consumers), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 994 (1982).
Most of these cases involved nonresident purchasers of goods or services. Such purchasers
often escape jurisdiction if the purchase is single and did not involve a personal entry into the
forum. E.g., Lakeside Bridge, 597 F.2d at 598 (denying jurisdiction when the defendant purchaser
never personally visited the forum state and was solicited by the seller elsewhere). Thus, a per-
sonal visit to solicit, negotiate, or supervise preparation of the purchase has become a significant
factor in upholding jurisdiction in these difficult cases. See infra text accompanying notes 101-02.
86. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476.
87. See supra note 84; see also Oswalt Indus., 297 F. Supp. at 313 (holding that negotiations
by mail and telephone are of "no significant weight" in determining whether defendant was trans-
acting business in the seller's home state).
88. See Oswalt Indus., 297 F. Supp. at 313 (basing jurisdiction upon mail and telephone
contacts would subject out-of-state consumers and mail-order buyers of every type to the risk of
local jurisdiction).
89. See supra text following note 49.
90. E.g., Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462,467-68 (1985) (noting the existence
of frequent communications between the parties).
91. Id.
92. In Burger King, the Court prominently mentioned the communications, but continuously
referred to the substantial and continuing relationship between the parties. 471 U.S. at 473, 476,
480, 487. If the relationship's connection with the forum is otherwise insubstantial, the presence
of telephone and mail communications between a defendant and the forum are "precisely the sort
of 'random,' 'fortuitous' and 'attenuated' contacts that the Burger King court rejected." Lak, Inc.
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A nonresident who personally enters a forum to solicit, negotiate, or
sign a contract, in effect, consents to general jurisdiction,9" provided service
is personally made during the entry period.9 4 When the breach of contract
finally occurs, however, the promisor is typically long gone from the forum.
Her former entry remains a significant jurisdictional contact, though. 95
That result is very defensible. If personal presence during the commission
of a tort or the performance of a contract is jurisdictionally conclusive, then
personal presence to solicit or negotiate a contract at the least should be
jurisdictionally significant. In both situations, the defendant's prior entry
suggests that travel to the forum state is neither prohibitively expensive nor
inconvenient. 96 On the other hand, local performance may require a much
more substantial involvement with the forum state than mere negotiation or
solicitation. In addition, the difference in cost and inconvenience between
local litigation and sending a salesperson to another state to solicit or nego-
tiate can be enormous, even though modem technology has made it easier
to litigate away from home today.97 Finally, the dispute may arise out of a
performance that occurred far from the place in which the contract was
negotiated and signed. That place may not be a desirable or convenient
forum, even though the defendant personally appeared there once during the
contracting process. 98
Despite the possible differences, courts tend to treat these two kinds of
v. Deer Creek Enters., 885 F.2d 1293, 1301 (6th Cir. 1989) (holding that where Indiana partner-
ship negotiated with plaintiff over purchase of Florida land, some substantial communications
between defendants and Michigan representatives of plaintiff were not sufficient to subject de-
fendants to Michigan jurisdiction), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1056 (1990).
93. Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 628 (1990) (upholding unanimously the valid-
ity of "tag" jurisdiction).
94. Traditionally, a corporation was present only where it was incorporated and, therefore,
could not be served elsewhere simply because of the presence or activities of corporate officers,
agents, or servants. Erlanger Mills v. Cohoes Fibre Mills, 239 F.2d 502, 508-09 (4th Cir. 1956)
(holding that isolated entry into forum by defendant's general manager to discuss plaintiff's claim
not a basis for jurisdiction over defendant corporation); JACK H. FRmDENTHAL ur AL., Civii. PRO.
cEntun 103 (1985). Eventually it was held that a corporation could be present elsewhere through
the activities-and now the contacts-of its servants, but this was primarily a species of specific
jurisdiction, and not the general jurisdiction created by service upon an individual found within
the forum. Id. at 112 (citing Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, 45 F.2d 139 (2d Cir. 1930)).
95. See cases cited supra note 85.
96. See supra text accompanying note 44.
97. Justice Brennan attributes the difference to improvements in the speed and reliability of
interstate travel and communications. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286,
303 n.5 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting). He fails to note, however, that these improvements also
make it easier for plaintiffs to litigate away from home and that plaintiffs, as a class, are perhaps
less helpless than they once were. See Louis, supra note 16, at 429 n.159 (noting financial
changes-like insurance and the contingent fee arrangement-that reduce the financial pressure
upon poor plaintiffs to settle early and cheaply).
98. See supra text accompanying notes 73-79 for a discussion of the fictive Helzberg's sce-
nario in which a contract negotiated in Missouri produced a dispute over a performance in Iowa.
PERSONAL JURISDICTION
personal local appearance almost identically-a local performance almost
always results in jurisdiction, 99 whereas local solicitation or negotiation
usually results in jurisdiction.'" Although judicial explanations of or justi-
fications for the latter result are scarce, there is one obvious explanation.
Single contract cases are difficult and have evenly divided the courts.1" 1
Add to any one of these cases a significant additional contact, a personal
appearance by the defendant in the forum state to negotiate, solicit, or facil-
itate the deal, and most courts will immediately breathe a sigh of relief and
uphold jurisdiction." 2 In so doing, courts need not also decide how
weighty a contact a personal appearance to solicit or negotiate is, or
whether it is as significant a contact as a personal local performance. They
only need conclude that both contacts are sufficient to resolve the jurisdic-
tional question. I
Finally, I should note that the lease between Helzberg's and Valley
West, like the franchise agreement in Burger King, created an ongoing
commercial enterprise or integration by contract between the contracting
parties.10 3 Substantial commercial players like these generally have the re-
sources and experience to deal with predictable adversities such as litigation
away from home, the sophistication to anticipate the possibility of such an
event, and the bargaining power to assure fair jurisdictional treatment in the
contract itself."° When these parties enter into such contracts, they should
understand that each typically will have a substantial jurisdictional claim at
home against the other. Thus, even the party with the weaker jurisdictional
claim-not surprisingly the plaintiff in both Burger King and
Helzberg's'°--often will be able to show enough contacts to establish ju-
risdiction. That result is more the product of the substantial, continuing,
99. See supra notes 25, 40 and accompanying text.
100. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
101. See infra note 144 and accompanying text.
102. E.g., Wisconsin Elec. Mfg. Co. v. Pennant Prods., Inc., 619 F.2d 676, 677 (7th Cir. 1980)
(upholding jurisdiction over a buyer in a single contract situation and distinguishing Lakeside
Bridge and Steel Co. v. Mountain State Constr. Co., 597 F.2d 596 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
495 U.S. 907 (1980), the leading case denying jurisdiction in such situations, simply because
agents of defendant had made several visits to the forum).
103. See supra note 92.
104. Contract terms may attempt to give locality to the contract by specifying where the con-
tract was accepted or made or where title to the goods passed. See generally Gentile, supra note
14, at 394-97 (discussing jurisdictional impact of various contract terms). Contract terms also
may specify governing law, see Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 481-482 (1985) (hold-
ing that choice-of-law provision cannot alone create jurisdiction but should not be ignored when
other contacts are present), or select a specific forum in which litigation must occur, see Carnival
Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 111 S. Ct. 1522, 1524-25 (1991) (upholding a forum selection clause
against a consumer-plaintiff).
105. Rudzewicz clearly could have sued Burger King in Michigan, where it had granted many
other, similar franchises and maintained a local office. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 466, 488.
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commercial relationship than the proffered list of contacts. The list of con-
tacts-e.g., the volume of interstate mail and telephone calls, the local per-
sonal visits to solicit and negotiate, the place of contracting, and agreements
as to governing law-is obviously not irrelevant. But most substantial
long-term contractual arrangements will generate enough contacts to sustain
local jurisdiction in either home forum. If that is so, the true source of
jurisdiction is the relationship out of which the list of contacts inevitably
arose.
D. Selling to or Buying from the Forum State
1. In General
Interstate and international transactions in merchandise generate many
lawsuits and jurisdictional questions as disappointed sellers and buyers each
seek to obtain local jurisdiction against the other. Sellers are particularly
susceptible to local jurisdiction wherever their goods are regularly shipped
to or sold."° Nonresident commercial buyers are similarly subject to local
seller actions in states where the buyers make regular purchases.10 7 Hence,
the most difficult cases are those in which the defendant is a con-
sumer-purchaser, 08 or the purchase or sale is single, isolated, random, or
out of the ordinary course of business and was arranged without personal
entry by the defendant into the forum state."m Thus, jurisdiction usually is
denied in local seller actions against nonresident mail-order con-
sumer-purchasers, 10 occasionally is denied in local buyer actions against
nonresident, one-shot sellers,"' and often is denied in local seller actions
against one-shot, nonresident commercial buyers."'
Helzberg's, which leased premises and operated a jewelry store in Iowa, clearly was amenable to
suit there by the lessor, Valley West. See supra text accompanying notes 67-68.
106. See infra notes 113-14.
107. Courts once expressed doubts about jurisdiction over nonresident commercial buyers,
even those who made regular purchases. E.g., M. Katz & Son Billiard Prods., Inc. v. G. Correale
& Sons, Inc., 232 N.E.2d 864, 865 (N.Y. 1967) (holding that a New Jersey firm regularly purchas-
ing from a New York firm was not transacting local business within the meaning of the New York
long-arm provision); see supra notes 7, 51. Today, courts often uphold jurisdiction even over
commercial buyers making only single purchases. See infra note 144 and accompanying text.
The implication of this deep judicial division with respect to single commercial purchases is that
jurisdiction over regular commercial purchasers, including those who do not personally enter the
forum, would almost always be upheld today. See supra note 7.
108. See supra note 36.
109. See supra text accompanying notes 99-102; infra text accompanying notes 115-19.
110. See supra notes 37, 82.
111. See infra note 119.
112. See infra note 144.
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2. Jurisdictional Assertions Against Sellers
A state may constitutionally assert jurisdiction over claims for eco-
nomic loss arising out of the defendant's regular sale or shipment of mer-
chandise into the forum state.' 13 Indeed few defendant sellers apparently
even bother to contest jurisdiction." 4 A jurisdictional challenge is possible,
however, if the shipment is single and outside the ordinary course of the
seller's business. Thus, in Erlanger Mills, Inc. v. Cohoes Fibre Mills,
Inc.," 5 a federal appellate court denied jurisdiction over a foreign corpora-
tion that, at the plaintiff buyer's request, had shipped a single order of alleg-
edly defective yam into the state." 6 Although this well-known, often
criticized" 7 decision apparently has not been followed by a single appellate
court,"' its result has been seconded by a handful of lower court decisions
involving the same atypical, extreme set of facts-a single sale solicited by
the local buyer from a nonresident seller who does no other business within
the forum state. 119 Even this narrow exception can be questioned, as the
113. E.g., Electro Craft Corp. v. Maxwell Elec. Corp., 417 F.2d 365, 368-69 (8th Cir. 1969)
(upholding Minnesota jurisdiction over a Texas seller even though the local buyer made the first
contact and the seller attempted to structure the transaction to stay out of Minnesota). Most
long-arm statutes have provisions asserting jurisdiction over sellers. E.g., UNm. InTERSTATE AND
Irr'L PRoc. Acr § 1.03(2), 13 U.L.A. 361-62 (1986) (providing that a state has jurisdiction when
a party "contract[s] to supply services or things in this state"); N.C. GEm. STAT. § 1-75A(5)(e)
(1992) (asserting jurisdiction when the contract "relates to goods, documents of title, or other
things of value actually received by the plaintiff in this State from the defendant through a carrier
without regard to where delivery to the carrier occurred").
114. There are few recent appellate cases involving defendant sellers. In one significant case,
however, a federal appellate court denied jurisdiction in Iowa over a nonresident corporate seller
that had reneged on its long-term contract to supply uranium to the local power company, but in
that instance the seller had delivered the uranium to Illinois for additional processing by a third
company, which then delivered the processed uranium to Iowa. Iowa Elec. Light & Power Co. v.
Atlas Corp., 603 F.2d 1301, 1305-06 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 911 (1980).
115. 239 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1956).
116. Id. at 508-09.
117. E.g., Williams v. Connoliy, 227 F. Supp. 539, 547-48 (D. Mini. 1964) (noting its disa-
greement with Erlanger Mills and citing other critical authorities).
118. Although Erlanger Mills recently was cited by the United States Supreme Court, it was
cited for the separate proposition that a seller would not be subject to jurisdiction in states in
which it made no sales but in which one of its products taken there by a purchaser caused injury.
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 296 (1980). In Choon Young Chung
v. NANA Dev. Corp., 783 F.2d 1124 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 948 (1986), the court of
appeals, citing Erlanger Mills, denied Virginia jurisdiction over an Alaskan seller, but in this
instance the Virginia plaintiff had gone to Alaska to place the single order, which was to be
delivered to the plaintiff at the airport in Alaska. Id. at 1124-26. Because of a delay with respect
to part of the order, however, the parties agreed that the plaintiff would depart without it and the
defendant would ship the balance of the order to Virginia. Id. at 1126. On these unusual facts, the
court concluded that the defendant had made no effort to serve the Virginia market. Id. at 1128.
119. See Wells Am. Corp. v. Sunshine Elecs., 717 F. Supp. 1121, 1127-29 (D.S.C. 1989)
(denying jurisdiction over Illinois corporation that did no local business but which on request sent
one order of circuit boards to plaintiff); Interstate Paper Corp. v. Air-O-Flex Equip. Co., 426 F.
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criticism of Erlanger Mills demonstrates. 120 Courts often maintain that a
defendant who sells within the forum state impliedly waives objections to
local jurisdiction by competing for local sales and profits.121 A seller who
elects to fill a single, unsolicited interstate order from a new market-and
who presumably would have no objection to filling additional orders from
this market-perhaps also should be deemed to have consented to jurisdic-
tion over claims arising out of the order.122 Perhaps an exception could be
made for a seller who fills a single order primarily to accommodate the
nonresident buyer, rather than to profit from or gain a foothold in the
buyer's market." These situations would be so rare, however, that a seller
claiming such an exception should have to prove it.
The consistency of the decisions suggests that most sellers should not
even bother to raise the defense of lack of jurisdiction over their person.
The plurality opinion in Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court24 gave
new jurisdictional hope, however, to one group of sellers-those who sell
Supp. 1323, 1324-27 (S.D. Ga. 1977) (denying jurisdiction over a nonresident parts supplier that
on request sold parts to plaintiff); Golden Belt Mfg. Co. v. Janler Plastic Mold Corp., 281 F. Supp.
368, 370-71 (M.D.N.C. 1967) (denying jurisdiction over a nonresident manufacturer that did no
local business but on request sent an order to the local plaintiff), aft'd, 391 F.2d 266 (4th Cir.
1968); J.P. Morgan v. Heckle, 171 F. Supp. 482, 483, 486 (E.D. Ill. 1959) (denying jurisdiction
over a nonresident defendant who did no local business but on request sent 25 bags of grass seed,
now claimed to contain noxious weed seeds, to plaintiff's agent in Illinois).
120. See supra note 117.
121. E.g., Electro-Craft Corp. v. Maxwell Elecs. Corp., 417 F.2d 365, 368 (8th Cir. 1969)
(explaining why courts more readily assert jurisdiction over nonresident sellers than buyers).
122. This would seem to be a fair description of the defendants in Erlanger Mills and the cases
cited supra in note 119.
123. No case to my knowledge involves such an accommodation. One can imagine a situation
in which a seller in one state sells an experimental product to a buyer in another state at the
request of a mutual friend and then is sued locally by the buyer because the product is defective or
causes injury.
124. 480 U.S. 102 (1987). Asahi, a Japanese manufacturer, had sold valve assemblies to de-
fendant Cheng Shin Rubber Indus. Co., a Taiwanese company that manufactured motorcycle tire
tubes. Id. at 106. One such tube incorporating an Asahi valve ended up inside a Honda motorcy-
cle tire, which burst in California. Id. at 105-06. The injured rider of the motorcycle sued several
companies, including Cheng Shin, which impleaded Asahi. Id. at 106. In her plurality opinion
upholding Asahi's jurisdictional challenge, Justice O'Connor concluded that Asahi had simply
sold its valve assemblies to Cheng Shin and had not sought to serve the California market, even
though its products were regularly sold and used there. Id. at 112. The other justices either
rejected or refused to consider this approach. Id. at 116.
Because of changes in the Supreme Court's membership since 1987, a majority may support
this view today. Lower federal courts have tried to avoid taking sides. Those upholding jurisdic-
tion often note that the facts satisfy both the traditional approach as well as the more demanding
Asahi approach. E.g., Benitez-Allende v. Alcan Aluminio do Brasil, S.A., 857 F.2d 26,29-30 (1st
Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1018 (1989). Those courts denying jurisdiction on the basis of
Asahi must, of course, endorse Justice O'Connor's approach. E.g., Falkirk Mining Co. v. Japan
Steel Works, Ltd., 906 F.2d 369, 374-76 (8th Cir. 1990) (denying jurisdiction over foreign firm
manufacturing a custom, expensive component known to be designed for use in America).
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their goods or component parts to or through other manufacturers or such
market intermediaries as distributors, wholesalers, fabricators, repackagers,
and assemblers,"z and thereby relinquish all interest in where, how, and
with what success their goods subsequently are marketed. 126 These initial
sellers, 127 the plurality said, should not always be subject to jurisdiction in
forums in which their goods are regularly sold to consumers, even if the
goods cause personal injury. To maintain this jurisdictional immunity,
however, the goods in their original form ideally should not be branded,
trademarked, or otherwise differentiated, lest these source designations
manifest a desire for notoriety in distant forums.' 21 The original sellers
125. Although Asahi dealt with a manufacturer of component parts, its potential applicability
to manufacturers of final products that distribute through intermediaries uniformly has been recog-
nized by lower federal courts. E.g., Soo Line R.R. v. Hawker Siddeley Canada, Inc., 950 F.2d
526, 528-29 (8th Cir. 1991) (denying jurisdiction in Minnesota when defective railroad car made
by defendant in Canada caused personal injury); Benitez-Allende, 857 F.2d at 28-30 (upholding
jurisdiction over foreign manufacturer of pressure cookers after careful consideration of Asahi).
126. In Asahi the plurality opinion stated:
The placement of a product into the stream of commerce, without more, is not an
act of the defendant purposefully directed toward the forum State. Additional conduct
of the defendant may indicate an intent or purpose to serve the market in the forum
State, for example, designing the product for the market in the forum State, advertising
in the forum State, establishing channels for providing regular advice to customers in
the forum State, or marketing the product through a distributor who has agreed to serve
as the sales agent in the forum State.
Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112.
127. A defendant seller of goods who deals anonymously and through intermediaries with the
forum state, and who may thereby claim jurisdictional immunity under Asahi, will ordinarily not
establish privity of contract with, or extend express warranties to, local plaintiffs. Local plaintiffs
who suffer personal injury or property damage from these goods still may assert against the de-
fendant seller valid substantive claims of strict tort liability. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 402A (1965). However, those local plaintiffs who suffer only economic loss-the per-
sons whose jurisdictional needs this discussion addresses-and who lack privity of contract may
assert a substantively valid claim for the implied warranty of merchantability in only a minority of
jurisdictions. E.g., Morrow v. New Moon Homes, Inc., 548 P.2d 279, 289-92 (Alaska 1976) (up-
holding warranty claim for economic loss from defects in a mobile home against remote manufac-
turer). See generally JAMS V. Wnr & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UnORM COMMERCIAL CODE
§ 11-5 (3d ed. 1988); BARKLEY CIARK & Cusronmon SMITH, THE LAW OF PRODUCT WARRAN-
'rs 10.03[3][d] (1984). Thus, although Asahi questions will arise most often in products lia-
bility actions involving claims of personal injury or property damage, such questions can also
arise in actions seeking only damages for economic loss.
128. The cases have not yet specifically addressed this issue. Differentiating the goods
through trademarks, trade dress, or distinctive packaging, all of which are designations of a com-
mon source, evidences a desire on the defendant-manufacturer's part to be known wherever the
goods are sold at retail. This desire is inconsistent with, if not fatal to, a claim of Asahi immunity.
Manufacturers, however, sometimes discretely and inconspicuously place their name on their
goods, even though that act normally is not required by law. Thus, Asahi valve stems are marked
with the circled letter "A," which apparently is Asahi's trademark. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 107.
Asahi's intent presumably is to facilitate identification, rather than to create local sales appeal.
Such a discrete, limited use of the manufacturer's name or trademark, without more, should not
constitute the additional purposeful contact with the forum that dissolves Asahi immunity.
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must also refrain from advertising,129 marketing, or servicing130 the goods
in the forum state either directly or through dealers. It may even prove fatal
to sell to an intermediary known to serve a specific geographic market.
131
In effect, the seller must appear to be ignorant of and totally indifferent to
what happens to the goods after they leave her possession.
Manufacturers of component parts requiring periodic replacement face
additional problems under Asahi. Replacement stocks of these parts nor-
mally are kept for sale within many states. In addition the manufacturers
often place their name and identifying marks indicating the model, type, or
size upon the parts or their containers. Should such business activity, which
tends to identify and locate the parts manufacturer within the forum and
increase its earnings therein, amount to a surrender of its Asahi defense,
even though someone other than the manufacturer is wholly responsible for
both the original and the replacement business? Recall that in Asahi the
component part in question was a valve that bore Asahi's trademark and
was incorporated into a motorcycle tire tube manufactured by defendant
Cheng Shin.'32 Replacement stocks of Cheng Shin tire tubes, many of
which employed Asahi valves, were maintained in many American motor-
cycle stores.'33 Although Cheng Shin apparently did not challenge local
jurisdiction,'34 Asahi persuaded four justices that despite the foreseeable
presence of its valves in tubes sold locally both as original equipment and in
replacement, it was not involved in this business and had not sought to
129. See supra note 126.
130. See Morris v. SSE, Inc., 843 F.2d 489, 491-94 (11th Cir. 1988) (holding a manufacturer
of parachute activation devices subject to a products liability, wrongful death suit in a state in
which manufacturer had no dealers but at the request of a local seller of skyjumping equipment
had serviced the device involved in the accident and returned it to the forum state).
131. Irving v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 864 F.2d 383, 387 (5th Cir. 1989) (upholding
jurisdiction over a foreign trading company that sent regular shipments of asbestos to a
Texas-based distributor), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 823 (1989); Benitez-Allende v. Alcan Aluminio
do Brasil, S.A., 857 F.2d 26, 29-30 (Ist Cir. 1988) (upholding jurisdiction in products liability
actions over a foreign manufacturer that chose a sales agent to represent it within the forum), cert.
denied, 489 U.S. 1018 (1989).
132. See supra notes 124, 128.
133. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 106 (1987) (noting that Cheng
Shin used Asahi valves frequently, but not exclusively). In one cycle store in Solano County,
California, approximately half its replacement stock of 115 tire tubes was found to have been
manufactured by defendant Cheng Shin. Id. at 107. If Cheng Shin was involved in this replace-
ment business, packaged the tubes in boxes containing its name, and also provided the local retail
store with advertising or promotional materials, it had clearly surrendered any claim to Asahi
immunity, even though the tube involved in the accident was part of the motorcycle's original
equipment and had not been sent to the United States by Cheng Shin.
134. There is no mention in Asahi of a jurisdictional challenge by defendant Cheng Shin.
Such a challenge would have had little chance for success, in part because of Cheng Shin's in-
volvement in the sale of replacement tubes. See supra note 133.
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serve the California market.135
A final issue involving sellers warrants discussion. The regular ship-
ment of goods into the forum state normally will subject a seller to local
jurisdiction with respect to claims for defects or deficiencies in the goods.
Will these shipments also expose a seller to local jurisdiction with respect
to other claims arising out of the relationship with the buyer? For example,
suppose that a foreign seller, at a local firm's behest, agrees outside the
forum to supply the latter with goods. Eventually the seller terminates the
relationship by refusing to fill new orders or violates an allegedly exclusive
relationship by dealing with a competitor of the local firm, who sues lo-
cally. In a number of these cases New York courts have denied jurisdic-
tion'36 on the sole ground that the defendant was not transacting local
business or the contacts were minimal. These cases are distinguishable from
Burger King, which involved a business relationship that was continuous
and substantial and was evidenced by a lengthy, written franchise agree-
ment.137 The "relationship" in the New York decisions was either oral or
was committed to a brief writing and amounted only to an expression by the
seller of a present willingness to fill the plaintiffs orders.' 38  This "rela-
tionship" would have enhanced the local forum's right to adjudicate a claim
that the goods actually shipped to the forum by the defendant were defec-
tive or deficient.13 9 However, the relationship was too thin to support juris-
diction over claims with respect to the relationship itself-i.e., that the
defendant wrongfully supplied others in competition with the plaintiff or
simply stopped dealing with the plaintiff.140 To support jurisdiction over
what amounts to a foreign breach of contract, a more substantial Burger
King-style relationship is required. "[If] the affiliating acts are limited in
scope... the jurisdictional risk will be correspondingly limited to claims
135. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112-13.
136. McKee Elec. Co. v. Rauland-Borg Corp., 229 N.E.2d 604, 607-08 (N.Y. 1967) (refusing
jurisdiction in a case involving termination of an unwritten, year-to-year distributorship agree-
ment); Standard Wine & Liquor Co. v. Bombay Spirits Co., 228 N.E.2d 367, 368-69 (N.Y. 1967)
(denying jurisdiction over a Scottish maker of Bombay gin who gave New York plaintiff an
exclusive agency but did not stop a Pennsylvania agent from reselling in New York); Kramer v.
Vogl, 215 N.E.2d 159, 160-62 (N.Y. 1966) (holding that Austrian corporation was not subject to
jurisdiction in New York for selling to plaintiff's competitor in violation of an alleged promise to
supply plaintiff exclusively).
137. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 466-67 (1985).
138. E.g., Kramer, 215 N.E.2d at 160-61 (involving a defendant Austrian leather supplier who
orally agreed in Paris to supply New York plaintiff, confirmed the an'angement by letter, and
thereafter filled plaintiff's orders, shipping F.O.B. European ports).
139. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
140. Recall the difficulty of asserting local jurisdiction over nonresidents who break promises
to perform locally. See supra text accompanying notes 27-30, 59-65. Here a nonresident defend-
ant allegedly has broken a promise to continue supplying the local plaintiff with goods either
exclusively or at all. Kramer, 215 N.E.2d at 160.
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arising specifically from them....""14  The principal affiliating acts herein
are shipments of goods to the plaintiff in the forum. The only claims aris-
ing specifically from these acts would be those asserting defects or deficien-
cies in the goods shipped.
3. Jurisdictional Assertions Against Buyers
A nonresident commercial buyer who regularly orders goods from a
local seller should be subject to local jurisdiction in an action arising out of
the cancellation or rejection of an order or a failure to pay for it.142 How-
ever, a nonresident consumer who fails to pay for goods ordered by mail or
telephone from a local seller normally is not subject to local jurisdiction.
14 3
Thus, it appears that a forum's power to assert jurisdiction over buyers in
actions by sellers depends on the frequency of the buying and the identity or
nature of the buyer. The difficult cases are those in which a nonresident
commercial buyer places a single order with a local seller. Many decisions
fit this pattern. The results are divided, 1" and no rule, test, or formula has
emerged. For now one can only identify those additional factors that seem
to move courts to deny or uphold jurisdiction. 145 Modem courts are not
moved by the fact that the contract was made or accepted or that title to the
goods passed in the seller's state,' 46 or that the seller's actions in filling the
141. Louis, supra note 16, at 428. In support of this assertion, I cited two well known early
cases, McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957), and Hanson v. Denckla, 357
U.S. 235 (1958). In McGee the Court upheld jurisdiction over an insurance company defendant in
a state where it did no local business. 355 U.S. at 221-23. The defendant, however, had reinsured
the life of a single local resident who had been insured by another company acquired by defend-
ant. Id. The McGee claim at least arose directly out of that one insurance policy. Louis, supra
note 16, at 428 n.149. In Hanson, where jurisdiction over an out-of-state trust company was
denied, the trust company had sent trust income to a beneficiary in the forum but was sued there
by others seeking to determine the validity of the entire trust. 357 U.S. at 238-40, 254.
142. See supra notes 7, 51, 107 and accompanying text.
143. See supra notes 36, 82.
144. In Lakeside Bridge & Steel Co. v. Mountain State Constr. Co., 597 F.2d 596, 601-02 (7th
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 907 (1980), the leading decision denying jurisdiction, the court
cited many of the cases dividing on this question. Many additional cases are cited and discussed
in Gentile, supra note 14, at 384-87, and Siegel, supra note 24, at 356-61. Some additional inter-
esting cases include Galgay v. Bulletin Co., Inc., 504 F.2d 1062, 1064-66 (2d Cir. 1974) (denying
local jurisdiction against a nonresident commercial purchaser of expensive, custom-made
machine); McQuay, Inc. v. Samuel Schlosberg, Inc., 321 F. Supp. 902, 903-07 (D. Minn. 1971)
(same); Misco-United Supply, Inc. v. Richards of Rockford, Inc., 528 P.2d 1248, 1250-53 (Kan.
1974) (denying jurisdiction over a nonresident repeat purchaser of goods that had been specially
ordered and made for the buyer outside state); Darby v. Superior Supply Co., 458 S.W.2d 423,
424 (Tenn. 1970) (denying jurisdiction over nonresident consumer-purchaser of an expensive or-
der of lumber from seller's stock, even though purchaser hired a truck to pick up the lumber
shipment in the forum state).
145. See Weintraub, supra note 35, at 625-26.
146. See supra note 75.
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order arguably amounted to a local performance of the contract as specified
in the applicable long-arm provision. 4 7 Many courts are very likely to be
influenced by the fact that the buyer personally entered the forum state in
connection with the solicitation, negotiation, or performance of the
purchase agreement. 148 Conversely, courts are reluctant to assert jurisdic-
tion in the seller's forum over passive purchasers who simply order and
await delivery.' 49
Courts are more sympathetic to a buyer who orders goods from a
seller's inventory than to one who orders goods that the seller must spe-
cially acquire or manufacture.'5 0 In the much discussed and criticized'
5 1
decision in Lakeside Bridge & Steel Co. v. Mountain State Construction
Co.,'"2 jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant buyer of custom-made
goods was denied. While acknowledging that the goods were specially
made for the defendant,' 53 the court noted that the contract did not specify
that the goods were to be produced in the seller's forum, although that was
the likely place of manufacture. 54 The court relied too heavily on this mi-
nor distinction, though; instead, it might have relied more on the fact that to
147. See Lakeside Bridge, 597 F.2d at 599-600.
148. See supra note 85.
149. Whittaker Corp. v. United Aircraft Corp., 482 F.2d 1079, 1084-85 (lst Cir. 1973) (distin-
guishing between passive and active commercial purchasers of specialized materials); In-Flight
Devices Corp. v. Van Dusen Air, Inc., 466 F.2d 220, 232-33 (6th Cir. 1972) (distinguishing be-
tween passive buyers and those who become actively involved in a transaction). Needless to say,
most mail order consumer-purchasers are passive purchasers. See Gergen, supra note 24, at 178,
for the suggestion that passive purchasers deserve protection because they usually lack awareness,
opportunity, and financial incentive to structure the transaction jurisdictionally.
150. E.g., In-Flight Devices Corp., 466 F.2d at 232 (affirming jurisdiction over a buyer who
entered into a contract "calling for substantial production of goods ... to take place entirely within
the forum state"); Nicholstone Book Bindery, Inc. v. Chelsea House Publishers, 621 S.W.2d 560,
561, 564-65 (Tenn. 1981) (affirming jurisdiction over nonresident who ordered custom book
binding in the forum state), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 994 (1982). But see Galgay v. Bulletin Co.,
Inc., 504 F.2d 1062, 1064-66 (2d Cir. 1974) (denying jurisdiction over buyer of expensive, cus-
tom-made machine); Hydrokinetics, Inc. v. Alaska Mechanical, Inc., 700 F.2d 1026, 1027, 1029
(5th Cir. 1983) (denying jurisdiction over buyer of custom-made product), cert. denied, 466 U.S.
962 (1984); Misco-United Supply, Inc. v. Richards of Rockford, Inc., 528 P.2d 1248, 1250-53
(Kan. 1974) (denying jurisdiction over sporadic nonresident purchaser from local seller, who had
the goods specially made for the buyer by a nonresident third party). In many of the cases denying
jurisdiction, the goods were rejected as defective or non-conforming by the buyer on receipt.
Some courts seem sympathetic to the buyer's claim that she did not get what she ordered and
should not be compelled to litigate this question elsewhere, particularly if the evidence of the
defect is in the buyer's state. See, e.g., McQuay, Inc., v. Samuel Schlosberg, Inc., 321.F. Supp.
902, 908 (D. Minn. 1971) (denying local jurisdiction over nonresident purchaser of allegedly
defective expensive machinery where witnesses to defect are in buyer's forum).
151. See Siegel, supra note 24 passim.
152. 597 F.2d 596, 597 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 907 (1980).
153. Id. at 598.
154. Id. at 603.
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obtain the business the seller personally had sought out the buyer in the
latter's home state. 5' Perhaps the court felt that the seller's willingness to
travel interstate to obtain the business was more jurisdictionally signifi-
cant 5 6 than the contract's requirement of custom manufacture by the seller.
For this reason I am not a critic of the court's result, but I also would
not oppose a contrary rule specifying that the custom manufacture or pro-
curement of expensive goods for a commercial buyer normally will support
jurisdiction over the buyer in the seller's forum.
157
Suppose that the seller in Lakeside Bridge had solicited the business by
mail or telephone and had not personally entered the buyer's home state for
that purpose. What significance, if any, should follow from the fact that the
seller initiated the transaction or that the buyer did not? This assumes, of
course, that the aggressor clearly can be identified. 158 Some cases purport
to attach significance to this fact; others downplay it.15 Thus, one critic of
Lakeside Bridge has noted that although the plaintiff was the aggressor, the
defendant thereafter placed the purchase order, provided design specifica-
tions, engaged in telephone and mail communication, and paid part of the
purchase price.'6 0 If these activities of the defendant buyer had clearly con-
stituted "purposeful availment," then its failure to make the first contact
obviously should not have mattered jurisdictionally. On the other hand, had
the question of sufficient contacts been close, then proof that the defendant
was, or was not, the aggressor perhaps would have been significant.
One commentator has suggested that the difference between the con-
sumer buyer, who is not subject to jurisdiction, and the one-time commer-
155. Id. at 598. But see Nicholstone Book Bindery, Inc. v. Chelsea House Publishers, 621
S.W.2d 560, 561, 563-66 (Tenn. 1981) (upholding jurisdiction over nonresident purchaser of cus-
tom binding even though seller's agents had visited the purchaser's place of business to arrange
the transaction), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 994 (1982).
156. The seller's trip to the buyer's forum also would have been a significant contact if the
buyer had sought to obtain jurisdiction over the seller there. See supra note 85. The trip would
have pointed to the seller as the aggressor or the party who had initiated the transaction-a fact
courts often find relevant in close cases involving assertions of jurisdiction over buyers. See infra
text accompanying notes 158-60. Thus, one can visualize the attorney for the buyer arguing to the
court as follows:
Plaintiff came to us and offered to supply the necessary structural assemblies, which
eventually arrived but were partially defective; and so we withheld a portion of the
purchase price. Why should we now have to litigate in Wisconsin when they manifested
a willingness to do business with us here?
157. See Siegel, supra note 24, at 357, 359-60; Gergen, supra note 24, at 179 (arguing that for
large transactions, defendant's awareness of the jurisdictional risk is greater and the transaction
costs of dealing with the risk are proportionally smaller).
158. See supra text accompanying notes 80-82.
159. See supra text accompanying notes 80-83; see also Siegel, supra note 24, at 357 (citing
cases that minimize the significance of the aggressor's identity).
160. Siegel, supra note 24, at 357.
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cial buyer, who should be, is that the latter has the knowledge, resources,
and incentive to structure the transaction and change the result through de-
vices such as forum selection and choice-of-law clauses.16' However, com-
mercial sellers possess equivalent incentives, knowledge and resources.
What then is the result if the contract is silent as to jurisdiction? Apparently
the writer believes-for reasons not specifically stated-that the commer-
cial buyer presumptively should be subject to jurisdiction in the commercial
seller's forum, just as the commercial seller presumptively is subject to ju-
risdiction in the buyer's forum. 162 In other words, both bear the onus of
freeing themselves contractually from the presumption. 163 Many purchase
contracts, however, are more the result of a battle of forms between the
parties than of specific negotiations. It is not self-evident that the absence
of jurisdictional provisions in the form actually used should resolve the ju-
risdictional question automatically because automatic solutions are not the
anticipated end product of efficient private ordering.
A different argument can be made for treating commercial buyers the
same as commercial sellers-that is, presumptively subject to jurisdiction in
the other's home state. Both activities generally are undertaken for
profit.'" If a seller in effect must consent to jurisdiction as the cost of
pursuing profitable sales in the forum,'65 then arguably so must a commer-
cial buyer seeking to make profitable local purchases. Both presumably are
equally able to litigate away from home, to budget for the expense and
inconvenience, and to anticipate and sometimes deal with the jurisdictional
problem contractually. Admittedly, greater personal effort normally is re-
quired. for successful selling than for buying. Consequently, buyers typi-
cally will have fewer contacts with the forum than sellers and perhaps more
often will be able to escape the presumption of jurisdiction through a show-
ing that the transaction was minimal, aberrational, or out of the ordinary
course of business. These escape possibilities are not wide enough, how-
ever, to undermine the basic validity of the presumption in its application to
buyers.
161. Gergen, supra note 24, at 178-79.
162. Id.
163. Different questions are raised when a commercial seller seeks contractual alteration of
the presumption that it is subject to jurisdiction in the consumer buyer's home state. Recently, the
United States Supreme Court suggested that in the absence of clear fraud or overreaching, the
seller's use of such clauses might be upheld. Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, 111 S. Ct. 1522,
1528 (1991) (upholding a forum selection clause in a consumer contract requiring an injured
cruise passenger to sue defendant cruise line at its principal place of business).
164. Siegel, supra note 24, at 357.
165. See supra text accompanying note 121.
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E. Continuing Commercial Relationships-The Burger King Case
In 1979, Burger King Corporation, one of the world's largest restau-
rant organizations, entered into a twenty-year agreement with two individu-
als for the operation of an existing franchise restaurant in Michigan.1 66 The
two franchisees paid a substantial initial fee, agreed to monthly payments
covering royalties, fees, and rent, 67 and submitted to extensive regulation
of their operation. 6 Although the franchisees initially had applied to, and
apparently dealt primarily with, Burger King's district office in Michigan,
they also dealt directly with the company's home office in Miami, Flor-
ida.'6 9 Within a year the business faltered and the franchisees, who fell
behind in their franchise payments, entered into extensive negotiations by
mail and telephone with officials of Burger King in Miami.170 Finally, Bur-
ger King canceled the franchise and ordered the two individuals to vacate
the premises.171 Upon their refusal, Burger King sued in federal court in
Miami, alleging breach of the franchise agreement and infringement of its
trademarks.' 72 The defendants unsuccessfully challenged the jurisdiction of
the Florida federal court over their persons, reversed that result in the court
of appeals, 173 but ultimately lost in the United States Supreme Court.
Writing for the Court, Justice Brennan noted that, contrary to state-
ments in the opinion of the court of appeals,' 74 the defendants often had
dealt directly by mail and telephone with the plaintiff's Miami office,
175
and that Rudzewicz was an experienced, sophisticated business person who
was clearly aware of his Florida connection. 76 Hence, the facts did not
compel a prophylactic result designed to protect consumers and small-time
166. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 466-67 (1985). Rudzewicz, a successful
Detroit accountant, put up the money for the franchise; MacShara, a younger man, was to manage
the restaurant; the two were to divide the profits evenly. Id.
167. For the twenty-year franchise period, Rudzewicz personally obligated himself to pay-
ments exceeding one million dollars. Id. at 467.
168. Id. at 465.
169. Id. at 466-67.
170. Id. at 468.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 468-69.
173. Burger King Corp. v. Macshara, 724 F.2d 1505 (1lth Cir. 1984). The majority opinion
relied heavily on cases denying jurisdiction over one-shot commercial purchasers and mail-order
consumer purchasers, id. at 1510, asserted that the defendants had dealt almost exclusively with
the plaintiff's district office in Michigan and could not foresee litigation in Florida, id. at 1511-12,
and expressed concern that a contrary result could subject small-time, "mom and pop" style fran-
chisees to unfair litigation in the franchisor's forum, id. at 1512.
174. See supra note 173.
175. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 467-68, 481.
176. Id. at 485.
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franchisees. 17 7  In upholding Florida's assertion of jurisdiction, Justice
Brennan emphasized the length and substantiality of the commercial rela-
tionship between the parties,17 the amount of money and interstate commu-
nications that regularly flowed from Michigan to Florida, 17 9 and the
existence of a Florida choice-of-law clause in the contract.
18 0
The impact of the choice-of-law provision on the result in Burger King
was insignificant. Whether and to what extent the presence of such clauses
might affect closer cases remains to be seen.18' Moreover, because the in-
terstate flow of money and communications is an inevitable byproduct of a
continuing, substantial, interstate commercial relationship, the latter cir-
cumstance should be seen as the centerpiece of the Court's jurisdictional
result.' 82 In effect, the Court seemed to say that whenever two business
persons enter into a substantial, continuing contractual relationship, each
ordinarily will be subject to jurisdiction in the other's home forum.1
83
Although the Court left open the possibility that exceptions might be made
for "mom and pop" franchisees unfairly subjected to litigation in the other
party's home forum,'8 4 its unsympathetic response to consumers subject to
177. Id. at 486-87 (responding to the fears expressed by the court of appeals; see supra note
173).
178. Id. at 487 (noting that Rudzewicz had "established a substantial and continuing relation-
ship with Burger King's Miami headquarters").
179. Id. at 465-66, 468, 481.
180. Id. at 481-82 (concluding that although a choice-of-law provision "would be insufficient
to confer jurisdiction," it should not be ignored in considering whether purposeful availment was
present).
181. Some of the commentary following Burger King opined that the Court had given sub-
stantial significance to the choice-of-law provision. See, e.g., Phyllis J. Towzey, Comment, 17
RUTGERs L.L 683, 696-97 (1986); John J. Carey, Note, Asserting in Personam Jurisdiction Over
Parties to a Contract: Burger King Corp v. Rudzewicz, 31 ST. Lotus U. L.J. 453, 469 (1987).
However, the Court employed the clause only as a makeweight argument. Indeed, I once believed
that, except for the closest cases, the clause would have little jurisdictional significance. In Carni-
val Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 111 S. Ct. 1522, 1528 (1991), however, the Court upheld the use
of a more drastic forum selection clause in a consumer form contract. Consequently, the Court's
willingness to give jurisdictional significance to a choice-of-law provision perhaps must be taken
more seriously.
182. See Duncan E. Barber, Note, Minimum Contacts in Single Contiact Cases: Burger King
Has Its Way, 1986 B.Y.U. L. REv. 505, 521 ("[T]he franchise agreement contemplated long-term,
continuing, and wide-reaching contacts with Burger King in Florida."); Carey, supra note 181, at
468 (emphasizing the long-term relationship).
183. Franchisors clearly are amenable to jurisdiction in local actions by franchisees. Thus, the
significance of Burger King is its approval of jurisdiction over franchisees in local actions by
franchisors. That is the more difficult case because of the already recognized danger of unfairness
to small-time franchisees. See supra notes 173, 177. Furthermore, since the home forums of the
parties to a substantial, continuing commercial relationship automatically have jurisdiction over
the parties with respect to disputes arising out of the relationship-and most jurisdictions have
declaratory judgment statutes-the danger of a race to the courthouse door, or parallel litigation in
both forums, arises.
184. See supra note 177.
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forum selection clauses"' suggests that it will condemn only truly blatant
jurisdictional overreaching.18 6 Perhaps state courts, which are free to de-
clare their own jurisdictional rules, 18 7 will take a less one-sided approach.
Although Burger King is regularly cited and followed, 88 its impact
upon promisors is still a question of conjecture or educated guess. The
decision's principal contribution is its admonition that courts resolving ju-
risdictional challenges should ignore or downplay technical considera-
tions, 1 8 9 and focus instead upon the contractual relationship between the
parties and the extent to which that relationship brought the defendant in
contact with the forum state. 190 Although Burger King's identification of
the proper focal point cannot be doubted, its principal effect unfortunately
will be to subject to local jurisdiction those contracting parties with the
185. See Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 111 S. Ct. 1522, 1528 (1991).
186. In Carnival Cruise Lines, the Court upheld a forum selection clause that required two
Washington State cruise passengers to sue in Florida for an accident that occurred in the Pacific
Ocean off the coast of Mexico. Id. at 1528. Carnival suggests that other consumers could be
required to sue a commercial seller in the seller's place of business, even though jurisdiction over
the seller usually exists in the buyer's home forum. Whether the Supreme Court would extend
Carnival to allow, as a matter of federal law, a clause exposing the consumer to suit by the seller
in the seller's home forum is unclear. In Burger King the Court upheld jurisdiction over the
franchisees in Florida. Hence, the Court presumably would uphold a forum selection clause man-
dating that result. However, Burger King franchises typically are not "mom and pop" operations.
Thus, the question remains whether the persons involved in small franchise operations would be
subject to jurisdiction in local franchisor actions, either because of Burger King or because a
forum selection clause in the agreement so provides.
187. Carnival Cruise Lines was an admiralty case governed by federal law, which will be
applicable to other federal causes of action. See Lee Goldman, My Way and the Highway: The
Law and Economics of Choice of Forum Clauses in Consumer Form Contracts, 86 Nw. U. L.
Rnv. 700, 704 (1992) (noting that MIS Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972), a
previous admiralty case upholding a forum selection clause, had been followed in other cases
involving federal causes of action). However, federal law is not binding on state courts adjudicat-
ing state causes of action. Id. at 705 n.28 (citing state cases that considered whether to follow MIS
Bremen). Carnival Cruise Lines's application to federal courts adjudicating state causes of action
is unclear. See Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22 (1988) (holding that federal court in
diversity considering transfer venue motion may take account of forum selection clause which is
disfavored under local state law).
188. In North Penn Gas Co. v. Coming Nat. Gas Corp., 897 F.2d 687, 689 (3d Cir. 1990),
cert. denied, 498 U.S. 847 (1990), the court upheld jurisdiction over a nonresident purchaser of
natural gas from a local plaintiff. The purchaser also had contracted with plaintiff for local stor-
age of gas at substantial minimum rates and had paid millions of dollars to plaintiff pursuant to
these rates, even though no gas actually was stored. The purchaser defendant repudiated the
storage arrangement before its termination. See Cottman Transmission Sys., Inc. v. Metro Distrib.,
Inc., 796 F. Supp. 838, 843-44 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (upholding jurisdiction over nonresident franchisee
pursuant to a long-term agreement containing a choice-of-law provision); Igloo Prods. Corp. v.
The Mounties, Inc., 735 F. Supp 214, 216 (S.D. Tex. 1990) (same).
189. See supra note 75 (identifying unimportant considerations, to which courts sometimes
have paid great heed, such as the place where the contract was made, or technically was to be
performed, or where title to the goods passed).
190. See Barber, supra note 182, at 508.
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weaker bargaining position. 191 Whether that will ever include those de-
fendants who currently enjoy some degree of jurisdictional immunity-con-
sumer purchasers, one-shot commercial purchasers, and promisors who
commit anticipatory breaches of single contracts-remains to be seen.
Thus, I have previously described cases in which a simple agreement to
supply a local firm with goods does not result in local jurisdiction to contest
the agreement's termination or adjudicate a claim that the agreement, now
described as a "franchise" or "distributorship," was exclusive.' 9 2 Although
at will supply arrangements are too insubstantial to satisfy the requirements
of Burger King,'9 3 an arrangement that lasts several years and generates
many shipments, substantial payments, and a volume of interstate commu-
nications does provide at least a colorable jurisdictional claim. Given the
local bias inherent in jurisdictional decisionmaking,' 94 some misapplication
of Burger King to these and other less substantial commercial relationships
must be anticipated.
IV. CONCLUSION
More than a half century ago Judge Learned Hand put the jurisdic-
tional question in the following words:
We are to inquire whether the extent and continuity of what [the
defendant corporation] has done in the state in question makes it
reasonable to bring it before one of its courts .... This does not
indeed avoid the uncertainties . . . but at least it puts the real
question, and that is something. In its solution we can do no more
than follow the decided cases.
195
Burger King asks the same question for contract cases but it similarly
fails to "avoid the uncertainties." The uncertainties are inherent in the fac-
tual variations among the cases and cannot be banished from the deci-
sion-making process. For that reason I have heeded Judge Hand's
admonition to "follow the decided cases." In that way one at least can
predict what most courts will do in a variety of repetitive patterns and situa-
tions, "[a]nd that is something."
191. See supra note 183.
192. See supra text accompanying notes 136-38.
193. See supra text accompanying note 137.
194. See Louis, supra note 16, at 431.
195. Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, Inc., 45 F.2d 139, 141 (2d Cir. 1930).
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